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Filling the Void: The Case for Repudiating and
Replacing Illinois' Void Sentence Rule
KristopherN. Classen*
HonorableJack O'Malley**

During the summer of 2010, the Illinois Supreme Court repeated the
"well settled" rule "that a [criminal] sentence that is in conflict with
statutory guidelines is void and may be challenged at any time."' The
predominant reason a judgment is considered void under Illinois law is
that "it was entered by a court that lacked jurisdiction of the parties or
the subject matter or that lacked the inherent power 2 to make or enter
the particular order involved." 3 Thus, this void sentence rule presumes
* Mr. Classen is a judicial law clerk for Justice Thomas E. Hoffman of the Illinois Appellate
Court First District, an Affiliate Professor of Law at Northern Illinois University College of Law,
and a former law clerk for Justice O'Malley. He graduated cum laude from the University of
Illinois College of Law.
** Justice O'Malley served on the Illinois Appellate Court Second District from 2000 to 2010.
Prior to his election to the bench, Justice O'Malley was twice elected as Cook County State's
Attorney. He graduated from the University of Chicago Law School as an Edwin F. Mandel
Fellow and attended Cornell University Law School as a Charles Evans Hughes Scholar.
The authors owe thanks to Laura E. Rodey for her unrelenting support and assistance, and to
Illinois Appellate Court Second District Research Director Jeffrey H. Kaplan for his
characteristically insightful suggestions.
1. People v. Petrenko, 931 N.E.2d 1198, 1206 (Ill. 2010).
2. The concept of "inherent power" is tied closely to the idea of court jurisdiction. See infra
note 49 and accompanying text.
3. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ill. 2000); see also Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher,
759 N.E.2d 509, 531 (Ill. 2001) ("[T]he dissent does not dispute that the trial court ... had both
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties. For this reason, the judgment
is not 'void."'); People v. Davis, 619 N.E.2d 750, 754 (Ill. 1993) ("Whether a judgment is void or
voidable presents a question of jurisdiction. . . . Where jurisdiction is lacking, any resulting
judgment rendered is void . . . ."); People v. Wade, 506 N.E.2d 954, 955-56 (Ill. 1987)
(explaining that a void judgment is one entered by a court without jurisdiction of the parties or the
subject matter, or lacking the "inherent" power to enter the particular order involved).
Illinois courts have also recognized that a judgment may be considered void if procured by
fraud. E.g., In re Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 846, 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); People ex rel.
Brzica v. Vill. of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66, 69-70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), overruledon other
grounds by People ex rel. Graf v. Vill. of Lake Bluff, 795 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Ill. 2003), and
Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 177, 185 (Ill. 2002).
Fraud is not a factor in the void sentence rule. Some Illinois Appellate Court authority supports
the idea that an order may be considered void if entered in an unconstitutional manner, but these
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that a circuit court has no authority to impose a sentence beyond the
applicable statutory range.4 As the court implied, this void sentence
rule has indeed become an incantation so oft recited that it no longer
bears scrutiny; the "accumulated weight of repetition" behind it has,
unfortunately, become an "invitation to think words rather than
things."5
More careful examination, however, belies the sanctity of the rule.
The "things" underlying the void sentence rule are the notions that a
circuit court derives its sentencing jurisdiction from statute and that a
circuit court exceeds its jurisdiction where it issues a sentence beyond
the statutory range. These notions conflict with an immutable tenet of
current Illinois law: a circuit court's jurisdiction flows directly from the
Illinois Constitution and does not come from the legislature, which,
except in the area of administrative review, has no control over court
jurisdiction ofjusticiable matters. 6
None of this is to say that, as a matter of policy, once a convicted
defendant has exhausted his direct appeals, he should have no forum in
which to challenge an erroneously harsh sentence. Nor is it to say that
cases draw their rule from inapposite federal jurisprudence and thus should not be followed. See,
e.g., Eckel v. MacNeal, 628 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (citing Hays v. La. Dock Co.,
452 N.E.2d 1383, 1388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (relying on federal law)); infra notes 57-66
(explaining why federal jurisdictional rules are not analogous to Illinois jurisdictional rules).
4. People v. Wade, 506 N.E.2d 954, 955-56 (Ill. 1987) (explaining that "[a] void judgment is
one entered by a court without jurisdiction . . . or that lacks 'the inherent power to make or enter
the particular order involved"' before holding that a sentence entered without statutory authority
is void); People ex rel. Ward v. Salter, 192 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ill. 1963) (determining that the trial
court's sentence exceeded statutory authority and issuing an order directing it to "expunge from
its records a void order entered by it without jurisdiction"); Armstrong v. Obucino, 133 N.E. 58,
59 (Ill. 1921) (stating that the rule that judgments cannot be attacked collaterally is subject to an
exception that "a decree may be void because the court has exceeded its jurisdiction"). The
decision in Armstrong is cited in a line of cases supporting the modem void sentence rule. See In
re T.E., 423 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ill. 1981) (citing People v. Hamlett, 96 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ill. 1951)
(citing People ex rel. Weed v. Whipp, 186 N.E. 135, 136 (Ill. 1933) (citing People ex rel. Modem
Woodmen of Am. v. Cir. Ct. of Wash. Cnty., 179 N.E. 441, 444 (Ill. 1931) (citing Armstrong,
133 N.E. at 59)))).
5. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal
Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REV.

1010, 1022-23 (1924). Although the authors were referring to writers' invoking an amorphous
principle they did not understand, their point is applicable here, where repetition has preempted
reflection to the point that the void sentence rule has become boilerplate, repeated without
thought to its provenance or virtue. See also In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391, 396 (Cal. 1993)
(introducing discussion of collateral remedies in California by noting that "[a]s with many rules
of law, multiple repetitions over time may tend to obscure the original purpose of the rule"); id
("It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a
long time cease to provoke further analysis." (quoting Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391
(1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
6. Belleville Toyota, 770 N.E.2d at 185 (explaining Illinois' current constitutional scheme).
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the State should not enjoy the same remedy for an illegally lenient
sentence.' In law, though, the reasoning employed to reach a result is at
least as important as the result itself, and has consequences much
farther-reaching. 8 Further, the persistence of the void sentence rule, in
the face of contrary constitutional principles, undermines the Illinois
Supreme Court's continuing efforts to clarify Illinois law on circuit
court jurisdiction. 9 Thus, although few would suggest that Illinois now
retreat from the result that a court may correct an improper sentence at
any time, the inescapable tension between the void sentence rule and the
Illinois Constitution demands that Illinois reconsider the path it takes to
that result.
This article scrutinizes Illinois' void sentence rule in an effort to
place it on surer legal ground. Part I discusses the development of the
void sentence rule in the context of the evolution of Illinois circuit
courts' jurisdictional authority. Part II argues that the rationale
supporting the void sentence rule, frail from the start, was left
irreparable by the 1964 amendments to the judicial article of the Illinois
Constitution, yet persisted through repetition in a bevy of decisions
blithely indifferent to the shifting constitutional landscape. Part II
therefore concludes that Illinois must abolish the void sentence rule.
From there, this article studies alternative, and more tenable, bases by
which Illinois can sustain the result that a sentence outside statutory
bounds may be corrected at any time, either by a defendant or by the
State. Part III observes the near universality of the principle that
defendants may challenge improper sentences at any time, and it
surveys the bases by which courts in other U.S. jurisdictions entertain
7. See People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 415, 429-30 (Ill. 2000) (explaining that a sentence
below the statutory minimum may be corrected on review even though the State may not
normally challenge a defendant's sentence on appeal).
8. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 635 (1995) ("The reasons
[lawyers and judges] provide [for their results] are broader than the outcomes they are reasons
for. . . . The lawyer or judge who gives a reason steps behind and beyond the case at hand to
something more encompassing."); cf People v. Sharifpour, 930 N.E.2d 529, 552 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010) (O'Malley, J., concurring) ("[The legal reasoning underlying the void sentence rule] leaves
courts faced with illegal-sentence issues in the uncomfortable position of choosing between
binding authority holding that such sentences are void as exceeding statutory authority and
equally binding authority holding that lack of statutory authority does not render a decision void.
Worse, a court asked to decide whether to extend the special rule for sentencing to a new context
must derive its analytical framework from an inscrutable and irreconcilable area of law.. .. As
the law now stands, we know that [illegal sentences may be corrected at any time], but we have
no tenable reason why, nor any framework for determining what other matters should receive
similar treatment.").
9. See In re Alex T., 873 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (citing a trio of Illinois
Supreme Court decisions trying to clarify the reach of circuit court jurisdiction under the current
Illinois Constitution).
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challenges to criminal sentences outside statutory limits. Part IV
concludes that Illinois' legislature should enact the most popular of the
alternative bases for allowing challenges to sentences by adopting Rule
35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
I. THE PATH TO THE VOID SENTENCE RULE

The void sentence rule, like so many creatures of the common law,
traces its lineage to principles long preceding it, and owes its
development to the desultory progress of the law surrounding it. The
void sentence rule grew from Illinois law governing circuit court
jurisdiction. Thus, the origins, rationale, and folly of the rule become
most apparent through the context of the jurisdictional principles that
bore it, and eventually evolved to contradict it. The first of these
jurisdictional principles were announced in the inaugural days of
Illinois' statehood.
A. 1818 Constitutionand Early Law
Illinois' first constitution, adopted in 1818, was a hastily crafted
documentIO whose judicial article contained a scant 557 words.11 The
founding charter vested judicial power in the Illinois Supreme Court

and "such inferior courts as the general assembly shall . . . establish,"1 2

and it allowed circuit courts "such jurisdiction as the general assembly
shall by law provide." 13 Thus, from the start, Illinois courts were
trained to look to the legislature as the only source of their subject
matter jurisdiction. 14 The legislature obliged by passing in 1819 a
10.

JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS 1818-1970, at 10 (1972) ("The

committee took only one week to draft the constitution, and the entire convention debated its
provisions only two weeks before approving the constitution in final form."). This haste reflected
both the urgency of Illinois' rush to statehood and the impatience of the drafters, id. at 10-11, and
it resulted in what has been characterized as a "badly organized" constitution, ROBERT P.
HOWARD, ILLINOIS: A HISTORY OF THE PRAIRIE STATE 115 (1972), that borrowed liberally from

those of other states, CORNELIUS, supra, at 11 (citing the U.S., Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Indiana constitutions); HOWARD, supra, at 103 (citing the New York, Kentucky, and Ohio
constitutions).
11. GEORGE FIEDLER, THE ILLINOIS LAW: COURTS INTHREE CENTURIES 1673-1973, at 189
(1973); see ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. IV.
12. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 1.

13. Id. § 4. Of the constitutions identified as models for the Illinois Constitution, see supra
note 10, Indiana's had the most similar provision regarding circuit court jurisdiction. It provided
that Indiana circuit courts would enjoy "[c]ommon law and chancery Jurisdiction, as also
complete criminal Jurisdiction, in all such cases and in such manner, as may be prescribed by
law." IND. CONST. of 1816, art. V, § 3.
14. See Estate of Mears v. Brady, 443 N.E.2d 289, 291 (1ll. App. Ct. 1982) ("The Illinois
Constitution of 1818 represented a legislative dominance of the matter [of courts' jurisdiction]."),
overruled on other grounds by Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 770
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precursor to what is now known as the Circuit Courts ActI 5 to allow the
circuit court subject matter jurisdiction over "all causes, matters, and
things at common law and in chancery,"' 6 and "all cases of treason,
felony, and other crimes and misdemeanors that may be committed ...
and that may be brought before them respectively, by any rules or
regulations provided by law." 17
Laws enacted soon thereafter set forth the crimes to be tried by the
circuit court and the sentences to be imposed for conviction. The state's
earliest criminal and sentencing laws employed a form of determinate
sentencing-definite sentences articulated at the time of sentencingl18
that, perhaps owing to the scarcity of prison facilities in the new Illinois
territory, relied largely on now-antiquated alternatives to
incarceration. 19 Although some of these early laws provided maximum

N.E.2d 177, 185 (Ill. 2002). (Brady's discussion of the constitutional history is, however, of
dubious merit, as discussed in notes 32 and 34, infra.) The Illinois legislature did not shy from
wielding its constitutional power over the judiciary; it thrice legislated the circuit court into and
out of existence before the constitution was amended in 1848. The History of the Illinois
Supreme Court, Chapter III: Early Courts in the State of Illinois: 1818 to 1848, ILLINOIS

SUPREME COURT, http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Historicalljudicialsystem.asp (last
visited Jan. 21, 2011) [hereinafter History of the Illinois Supreme Court]. It also effected drastic
changes to the Illinois Supreme Court in response to a politically unpopular court decision.
CORNELIUS, supra note 10, at 36.

15. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/0.01 to 35/36 (2008).
16. The phrase "at common law and in chancery" was interpreted to refer to "all the powers
and jurisdiction of the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas in England." Beaubien v.
Brinckerhoff, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 269, 273 (1840). Historically, Courts of the King's Bench, i.e.,
courts of equity or chancery, provided equitable relief by exercising the King's "prerogative to
dispense justice despite the law." Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is JurisdictionJurisdictional?,95 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1207, 1250-51 (2001); see also FIEDLER, supra note 11, at 240-41 ("In Illinois, as in
almost all other states, the terms 'court of chancery,' 'court of equity,' 'chancery,' and 'equity'
are used synonymously."). Courts of Common Pleas, i.e., courts of law or common law courts,
applied the common law.
17. An Act Regulating and Defining the Duties of the Justices of the Supreme Court, Laws of
Illinois 1819, §§ 26, 28, at 380.
18. David H. Norris & Thomas Peters, Fiscal Responsibility and Criminal Sentencing in
Illinois: The Time for Change is Now, 26 J. MARSHALL. L. REv. 317, 319-20 (1993).

Determinate sentencing contrasts with indeterminate sentencing, a form of sentencing in which
the sentencing authority announces a range of punishment and leaves to corrections authorities
(often a parole board or corrections facility) the task of determining the ultimate sentence to be
served. Id. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN

HISTORY 304-08 (1993) (discussing states' historical oscillation between the two approaches).
19.

See ANDREW A. BRUCE, THE WORKINGS OF THE INDETERMINATE-SENTENCE LAW AND

THE PAROLE SYSTEM INILLINOIS 20-21 (1928); James B. Haddad, Commentary: Some Lessons
from the History of Illinois Sentencing Laws, 2 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 19, 23 (1981) (citing BRUCE,

supra, at 21-22). Alternative penalties included "whipping," "confinement in stocks and
pillories," or, for more serious crimes, "[d]eath by hanging." HOWARD, supranote 10, at 117.
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punishments or even ranges of punishment,2 0 the void sentence rule did
not arise in Illinois law until some time later.
At this nascent stage, the common law formed the basic principles
that would shape the future of Illinois law on jurisdiction. Two of these
basic principles prove relevant to this discussion. First, the Illinois
Supreme Court's early case law stated the rule that a judicial decision
will be considered void, and thus a nullity, when handed down by a
Second, the court
court without subject matter jurisdiction. 2 1
distinguished between such void court orders, which could be attacked
at any time, even collaterally, and voidable court orders, which could be
upended only by a reviewing court through the direct appeal process.
The Illinois Supreme Court's first extended articulation of this voidvoidable distinction sets forth a conception that survives to this day. In
1841, in Buckmaster v. Jackson ex dem. Carlin,22 the court explained:
In cases of errors or irregularities occurring, they are to be corrected,
either by an application to the tribunal where they arise, or in an
appellate court, by some direct proceeding between the parties. On the
contrary, where this jurisdiction over the person, or subject matter,
does not exist, the judgment is a mere nullity; decides nothing;
concludes no one; and may be rejected, when collaterally drawn in
question. . . . When a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide
every question that arises in the cause, and whether the decision be
correct or not, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in
every other court.. . . The leading distinction is between judgments
and decrees merely void, and such as are voidable only. The former
are binding nowhere; the latter every where, until reversed by a
superior authority.2 3

20. For example, in 1827, arson was punishable by not more than one hundred lashes and
imprisonment not exceeding three years; robbery was punishable by a fine, not less than fifty or
more than one hundred lashes, and imprisonment not exceeding three years. BRUCE, supra note
19, at 20.
21. Robinson v. Harlan, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 237, 237 (1835) (holding that whenever a justice of
the peace-a tribunal inferior to the circuit court-"assumes jurisdiction in a case not conferred
by the statute, its acts are null and void"); Tindall v. Meeker, 2 111.(1 Scam.) 137, 137 (1834) ("If
an inferior court [a justice of the peace] entertains jurisdiction of a case, and gives judgment,
where by law such inferior court has no jurisdiction, the whole proceedings are coram non judice
and void."); Flack v. Ankeny, 1 Ill. (Breese) 187, 189 (1826) ("'[Wlhere the justice [of the peace]
has no jurisdiction, and undertakes to act, his acts are coram non judice, but if he has jurisdiction,
and errs in exercising it, then the act is not void, but voidable, only."' (quoting Butler v. Potter, 17
Johns. 145, 145 (N.Y. 1819))).
22. 4 111. (3 Scam.) 104 (1841).
23. Id. at 106-07. Modern formulations of the void-voidable distinction hew neatly to these
ideas. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mitchell, 692 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ill. 1998); People v. Davis, 619
N.E.2d 750, 754 (111. 1993).
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The notion that a decision was considered void if entered without
jurisdiction, combined with the constitutional constraints allowing
Illinois courts jurisdiction only to the extent contemplated by statute,
compelled early Illinois courts to take great care to avoid overstepping
their authority. In fact, an early rule developed under which a
complaint seeking to invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction "must
contain sufficient matter to give the justices jurisdiction, or the whole of
the proceedings will be coram non judice,24 and consequently, void." 25
Although Illinois would later replace its original constitution and
substitute increasingly liberal provisions on circuit court jurisdiction,
the common law never fully let go of its original anxieties regarding
statutory compliance.
B. The 1848 and 1870 Constitutions

In 1847, the delegates to Illinois' second constitutional convention
assembled, determined to rectify what had come to be seen as the
inadequacies of the 1818 charter 26 and to modernize the constitution for
a rapidly changing state. 27 The three-month effort28 led to a new
constitution, adopted in 1848,29 that was "considerably longer and more
detailed than that of 1818.",30 The most widely noted changes embodied
by the 1848 Constitution's judicial article were the provisions governing
the makeup of the Illinois courts. 3 1 In addition, the revised constitution
contained a new definition of circuit court jurisdiction: where the 1818
24. The phrase coram nonjudice ("not before a judge") describes a matter "[b]efore a judge or
court that is not the proper one or that cannot take legal cognizance of the matter." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 362 (8th ed. 2004).
25. Wells v. Hogan, 1 111. (Breese) 337, 338 (1830). In Wells, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that the initial complaint failed to describe all of the elements necessary to sustain a cause of
action under a forcible detainer statute, and, accordingly, the Court concluded that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action. Id.; see also Clark v. Roberts, 1111. (Breese) 285,
287 (1828) ("The affidavit was necessary to give jurisdiction to the justice. It does not comply
with the requisition of the statute; hence, all subsequent proceedings are void.").
26. CORNELIUS, supra note 10, at 33 ("A major effort was made by the delegates to correct all
mistakes made in the 1818 document.").
27. Id at 25-27 (summarizing Illinois' population growth, changing settlement patterns, and
developing economic, social, and political concerns); id. at 25, 28-29 (noting popular loss of
confidence in the 1818 Constitution).
28. FIEDLER, supra note 11, at 210. These three months far exceeded the time used to draft
the 1818 Constitution. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
29. ILL. CONST. of 1848.
30.

CORNELIUS, supra note 10, at 32; see also FIEDLER, supra note 11, at 210.

31. See CORNELIUS, supra note 10, at 36 (discussing provisions for election of judges);
FIEDLER, supra note 11, at 210 (stating that the 1848 Constitution's "providing for a system of
courts to be elected by the people" was "a definite departure from the previous appointive
system").
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Constitution allowed circuit court jurisdiction only "as the general
assembly shall by law provide," the 1848 Constitution conferred
jurisdiction to circuit courts "in all cases at law and equity." 32 The 1848
Constitution also granted limited jurisdiction to two types of inferior
tribunals: county courts and justices of the peace. 33
The next revision to Illinois' Constitution, in 1870, brought no
substantive change to the reach of circuit court original jurisdiction; it
allowed circuit courts "original jurisdiction of all causes in law and
equity."34
However, to accommodate the judiciary's growing

32. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 8. The phrase "cases in law and equity" mirrors a similar
concept contained in Illinois' first Courts Act, which allowed jurisdiction over "all causes,
matters, and things at common law and in chancery." See Estate of Mears v. Brady, 443 N.E.2d
289, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 177, 185 (Ill. 2002). It should be noted that the decision in
Brady, in an attempt to characterize the development of Illinois law on jurisdiction as a "tug-andpull imbroglio between the courts and the legislature," id., actually gives a misleading impression
of constitutional progress on the issue. Brady correctly notes that, prior to the 1848 Constitution,
the Illinois Supreme Court had interpreted the Courts Act as conferring "original and unlimited

jurisdiction." Id (quoting Beaubien v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 269, 273 (1840)). Brady
then incorrectly portrays the 1848 Constitution as repudiating the "original and unlimited" idea
by employing a "restrictive" "'law and equity' concept found in the early statutes." Id A fair
reading of the 1818 and 1848 Constitutions reveals a linear progression of circuit court
jurisdiction. The 1818 Constitution conveyed no jurisdiction to the circuit court except that
which the legislature deigned to provide. After the legislature provided such jurisdiction, the
1848 Constitution solidified it by directly providing for circuit court jurisdiction to the same
extent as the legislature had provided. Thus, the 1848 Constitution actually represented a step
forward for circuit court authority, not a step backward as Brady claims.
33. County courts were created by section 16 of the judicial article. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art.
V, § 16. Their jurisdiction extended "to all probate and such other jurisdiction as the general
assembly may confer in civil cases, and such criminal cases as may be prescribed by law, where
the punishment is by fine only, not exceeding one hundred dollars." Id § 18. Justices of the
peace were created by section 27, which conferred them "such jurisdiction[] as may be prescribed
by law." Id § 27.
34. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 12; FIEDLER, supra note 11, at 248 ("[B]asically, the
constitutional judicial system of the Constitution of 1848 was carried into the Constitution of
1870 [with limited changes]."). Some authority has suggested that, in the march toward more
liberal constitutional grants of jurisdiction to the circuit court, the 1870 Constitution's use of the
phrase "original jurisdiction" represented a "cautious step forward" from the plain "jurisdiction"
referenced in the 1848 Constitution. Brady, 443 N.E.2d at 291. However, the word "original" in
this context does not appear to imply any stronger grant of authority; rather, it appears to imply a
distinction between circuit courts' "original jurisdiction" and their "appellate jurisdiction" over
inferior courts described in the very same sentence of the 1870 Constitution. See ILL. CONST. of

1870, art. VI, § 12 ("The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all causes in law and
equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as is or may be provided by law."). This combines with
other errors, see supra note 32, to impugn the accuracy of the Brady court's recitation of the
constitutional history of Illinois courts' jurisdiction. It is worth noting, then, that Brady's

ultimate holding-its interpretation of the 1970 Constitution-was repudiated by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Belleville Toyota, 770 N.E.2d 177. See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying
text.
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caseload, 3 5 as well as the state's rapidly emerging urban-rural
dichotomy, 36 the new constitution not only added more judges (and an
intermediate appellate court 37), but also reorganized the judiciary to
create a complex system of specialized inferior courts of limited
jurisdiction, 38 including county courts, 39 probate courts, 40 justices of the
peace, 4 1 and Cook County criminal courts. 42
Illinois courts determined that the circuit courts' jurisdiction over "all
causes in law and equity"
include[d] every claim or demand in a court of justice which was
known at the adoption of the Constitution as an action at law or a suit
in chancery, and also all actions since provided for which involve[d]
personal or property rights of the same nature as those previously
enforced by actions at law or in equity.43
The circuit courts' jurisdiction did not, however, extend to "special
statutory proceedings involving rights and providing remedies not of a
kind previously existing in law or equity." 44 Accordingly, in statutory
proceedings, as with inferior courts of limited jurisdiction, 4 5 courts were
35. HOWARD, supra note 10, at 335 (stating that the reorganization was effected in part to
address congested court dockets).
36. CORNELIUS, supra note 10, at 70 (explaining that delegates generally loath to facilitate
disparate treatment for urban and rural areas "admitted the realities of Chicago's judicial
problems" and granted Chicago special treatment); History of the Illinois Supreme Court, supra

note 14 (stating that the Constitution of 1870 was written for a "part urban-part rural state").
37. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 11.
38. Harry G. Fins, Analysis of Illinois JudicialArticle of 1961 and Its Legislative andJudicial

Implementation, 11 DEPAUL L. REv. 185, 188-89 (1962). Later amendments led to the creation
of additional specialized inferior courts. Id. at 186. By the late 1950s, the system encompassed
"102 county courts, 20 circuit courts, 14 probate courts, 29 city courts, a superior court of Cook
County, a Criminal Court of Cook County, three municipal courts, over 2700 justices of the
peace[,] and approximately 500 police magistrates," often with confusing or even overlapping
jurisdictions. Robert H. Frick, Order from Chaos: Court Integration Under the Proposed
Judicial Article, 39 CHI. B. REc. 269, 269 (1958). See generally Nat M. Kahn, Concurrent
Jurisdiction of Circuit Court with that of ProbateCourt in Claims against Estates of Decedents,

42 CHI. B. REC. 277 (1961) (describing one area of jurisdictional confusion under the 1870
Constitution); Samuel W. Witwer, Jr., The Illinois Constitution and the Courts, 15 U. CHI. L.

REv. 53 (1947-1948) (describing confusion regarding jurisdiction and arguing for consolidation
of Illinois courts); ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, comm. cmt. 4 (West 1964) ("[A] virtual
hodgepodge of courts had developed, particularly in the Cook County or Chicago metropolitan
area."). This confusion strongly motivated the 1964 amendments to the judicial article. See infra
notes 85-90 and accompanying text.

39. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 18.
40. Id. § 20.
41.

Id. § 21.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. § 26.
People v. Graw, 2 N.E.2d 71, 72-73 (Ill. 1936).
Id. at 73.
Brown v. Van Keuren, 172 N.E. 1, 3 (Ill. 1930) ("Whatever the rank of the court
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required to "exercise their powers within the limits of the jurisdiction
conferred by statute." 46 Thus, subject matter jurisdiction for inferior
courts of limited jurisdiction and for circuit courts in statutory
proceedings became "not only the power of the court to hear and
determine [a case], but also the power to render the particular judgment
entered."47 Where such a court entered a judgment that "transcend[ed]
the statute conferring jurisdiction," the "judgment or decree [was] void
and [could] be collaterally impeached or set aside . . . after the time for

review had expired." 48 This concept was expressed alternatively as the
circuit court's exceeding its jurisdiction or acting without "inherent
power." 49 These ideas formed the basis of the void sentence rule.
C. The Birth of the Void Sentence Rule
The current incarnation of the void sentence rule traces to the Illinois
Supreme Court's 1918 decision in People ex rel. Maglori v. Siman.50 In
Siman, the convicted larcenist Mike Maglori petitioned for habeas
corpus relief from his imprisonment on the ground that the larceny
statute allowed a sentence of a fine or imprisonment, yet he received
both.51 The court began its analysis of Maglori's collateral attack on his
sentence by citing the general principle that "'[j]urisdiction' in a
exercising a special statutory jurisdiction, it is governed by the same rules as courts of limited
jurisdiction."); Keal v. Rhydderck, 148 N.E. 53, 55 (Ill. 1925) (same); Haywood v. Collins, 60 Ill.
328, 333 (1871) (finding that courts exercising statutory jurisdiction "stand[] upon the same
ground and [are] governed by the same rules as courts of limited and inferior jurisdiction").
46. Smith v. Smith, 166 N.E. 85, 88 (111.1929).
47. Thayer v. Vill. of Downers Grove, 16 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938), overruled on
other grounds by James v. Frantz, 172 N.E.2d 795 (Ill. 1961); see Armstrong v. Obunino, 133
N.E. 58, 59 (Ill. 1921) (stating that the rule that erroneous judgment may not be collaterally
attacked "is subject to an exception . . . that the decree may be void because the court has
exceeded its jurisdiction," and explaining that the authority of courts of limited jurisdiction was
circumscribed by statute).
48. Thayer, 16 N.E.2d at 719.
49. People v. Sharifpour, 930 N.E.2d 529, 547-48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) ("Some courts
characterize the [inherent power requirement] as a subspecies of subject matter jurisdiction while
others characterize it as a situation where a court acts in excess of its jurisdiction." (citing In re
Gilberto G.-P., 873 N.E.2d 534, 539 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (Grometer, J., concurring) (noting that
the jurisdictional problem of a court lacking "the power to render a particular disposition" had
been characterized as lacking subject matter jurisdiction or as lacking jurisdiction generally))).
The very phrasing of the term "inherent power" suggests that it was coined to describe power
courts intrinsically possess, such as the power to protect their dignity through contempt
proceedings, e.g., Stewart v. Lathan, 929 N.E.2d 1238, 1244 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), but devolved to
a misnomer that described power the courts had or had not been conferred by an extrinsic source,
such as the constitution or the legislature, cf Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 759 N.E.2d 509, 51819 (Ill. 2001) (describing the "'inherent power' requirement").
50. 119 N.E. 940 (Ill. 1918).
51. Id. at 941-42.
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particular case is not only the power of the court to hear and determine
but also the power to render the particular judgment entered, and every
act of the court beyond its jurisdiction is void." 52 The court adapted this
general principle to the context of criminal sentencing by borrowing the
statement of law from the United States Supreme Court that "[i]f [a]
court or judge had no jurisdiction to render the judgment and sentence
complained of, the judgment is void, and one imprisoned under and by
virtue of it may be discharged from custody on habeas corpus."53 The
court then concluded that the governing larceny statute did not authorize
the circuit court to impose both a fine and a prison sentence on Maglori,
and thus the court, having imposed the fine, exceeded its statutory
jurisdiction when it added the prison sentence. 54 As a remedy, the court
declared Maglori's sentence "void as to the excess," and, because
Maglori had paid his fine, the court held his excess prison term to be
null.5 5 This conception of the void sentence rule survives to the
present.56

52. Id at 942 (citing Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23 (1879); Chi. Title & Trust Co. v. Brown,
55 N.E. 632, 633 (Ill. 1889)). The efficacy of these citations is discussed infra at notes 57-66 and
accompanying text.
53. Siman, 119 N.E. at 942 (citing In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 261 (1894); United States v.
Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48, 62-63 (1894); In re Swan, 150 U.S. 637, 651 (1893); Exparte Nielsen,
131 U.S. 176, 182 (1889)).
54. Id. at 942 ("The trial court had jurisdiction to either fine [Maglori] or to imprison him
within the limitations of the statute; but the court did not have jurisdiction to both fine and
imprison [him], as it did in this case. The court therefore exceeded its jurisdiction.").
55. Id at 942-43. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pridgeon, there had
been some dispute as to whether an excessive sentence should be deemed void in its entirety (so
that any prisoner so sentenced would be allowed to go free) or void only as to the excess (so that
a prisoner so sentenced would be freed once he served the statutory maximum). Recent Case, 9
HARv. L. REv. 287, 287 (1895). Pridgeon resolved that dilemma by choosing the latter option.
This remedy-declaring void the excess portion of a sentence-had been suggested in an earlier
Illinois Supreme Court decision, People ex rel. Busch v. Green, 117 N.E. 764, 766-67 (Ill. 1917),
but it was not invoked in that case because the Green court determined that the prisoner there was
not entitled to release. Prior Illinois Supreme Court decisions had rejected void sentence
arguments. See People ex rel. Harris v. Graves, 114 N.E. 556, 556 (Ill. 1916) (rejecting the
argument that defendant could use habeas corpus proceedings to challenge a sentence as void);
People ex rel. Henderson v. Allen, 43 N.E.2d 332, 332 (Ill. 1896) ("If there was any error
committed by the court in the trial of the cause or in the sentence of the petitioner, that is a
question which may be reviewed by writ of error; but the party has no right to a writ of habeas
corpus."). One prior decision had allowed a collateral challenge to a sentence on the ground that
it was void, but the challenge was based not on conformity with statutory limits but instead on the
indefinite nature of the sentence. See People ex rel. Hinckley v. Pirfenbrink, 96 Ill. 68, 68 (1879)
(declaring void a sentence that would end only "on the will of the [sentencing] judge").
56. See, e.g., People v. Petrenko, 931 N.E.2d 1198, 1206-07 (Ill. 2010) (noting that it is well
settled that a sentence that is in conflict with statutory guidelines is void).
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE VOID SENTENCE RULE

The void sentence rule developed from principles of limited circuit
court jurisdiction created under Illinois' first three constitutions to hold
that a sentence in excess of statutory limits is void and thus may be
challenged at any time because a court has no authority to impose it in
the first place. Even if this result might be laudable, the rationale
supporting it was troubled from the start. That trouble, combined with
the jurisdictional transformation wrought by the 1964 amendments to
the judicial article of the Illinois Constitution, made the rationale
supporting the rule entirely specious. However, in spite of these
troubles, or in indifference to them, the rule perpetuated itself through
the force of its own repetition.
A. Initial Problems with the Void Sentence Rule

From the time the void sentence rule was articulated in People ex rel.
Maglori v. Siman, it was beset by difficulty for several reasons.
First, the rule was founded on a tenuous analogy between Illinois and
federal jurisdictional principles. The Siman court relied on a United
States Supreme Court decision, Ex parte Reed,57 and a prior Illinois
Supreme Court decision, Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Brown,58 to
support its statement that "jurisdiction" entails "not only the power of
the court to hear and determine but also the power to render the
particular judgment entered." 59 Brown, however, made no such
statement. 60 Thus, Siman had only the United States Supreme Court
Siman, 119 N.E. at 942 (citing Exparte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23 (1879)).
Id. (citing Chi. Title & Trust Co. v. Brown, 55 N.E. 632, 633 (Ill. 1899)).
Id.
The relevant passage from Brown provides as follows:
'Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy
between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them. The
question is whether, in the case before a court, their action is judicial or extra judicial,
with or without the authority of law to render a judgment or decree upon the rights of
the litigant parties. If the law confers the power to render a judgment or decree, then
the court has jurisdiction. What shall be adjudged between the parties, and with which
is the right of the case, is judicial action, by hearing and determining it.' Bouvier
defines 'jurisdiction' as follows: 'Jurisdiction is the authority by which judicial officers
take cognizance of and decide cases; power to hear and determine a cause; the right of
a judge to pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or issue before him, acquired
through due process of the law.'
55 N.E. at 633 (quoting People v. Seelye, 32 N.E. 458, 468 (Ill. 1892) (quoting Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 714 (1838))). This passage refers only to a court's power
to hear the dispute at issue, not to a court having the power to render a particular judgment. The
dissenting justice in Siman made this same observation. See Siman, 119 N.E. at 944 (Carter, J.,
dissenting) ("I do not think the reasoning in [Brown] supports the definition given in the opinion
as to the meaning of jurisdiction.").
57.
58.
59.
60.

2011]

Filling the Void

439

case to support its description of jurisdiction. Likewise, Siman
mustered only federal case law to support its statement that "[i]f [a]
court or judge had no jurisdiction to render the judgment and sentence
complained of, the judgment is void, and one imprisoned under and by
virtue of it may be discharged." 61 Unfortunately, the analogy between
Illinois and federal law does not hold. The United States Constitution
does not directly establish the jurisdiction of federal trial courts but
instead leaves to Congress the authority to "ordain and establish" such
lower federal courts. 62 This power to "ordain and establish" inferior
courts has been interpreted to indicate that all federal courts inferior to
the Supreme Court derive their authority from the legislature, which has
the "power of 'investing [inferior courts] with jurisdiction either
limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from
them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem
proper for the public good."' 6 3 Thus, federal district courts are, by
definition, courts whose jurisdiction is always limited by statute.
Illinois circuit courts at the time of Siman, on the other hand, had
limited jurisdiction only in certain situations and otherwise enjoyed
constitutional jurisdiction over "all causes in law and equity."64 This
general jurisdiction, unlike that of federal trial courts, extended to
criminal matters. 65 When it borrowed federal law regarding voidness of
excessive sentences, the Siman court incorrectly assumed that Illinois
circuit courts were, like federal trial courts, courts of limited jurisdiction
for all purposes. 66
61. Siman, 119 N.E. at 942 (citing In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 261 (1894); United States v.
Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48, 62-63 (1894); In re Swan, 150 U.S. 637, 651 (1893); Ex parte Nielsen,
131 U.S. 176, 182 (1889)).
62. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
63. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2006)
(conferring federal district courts "original jurisdiction ... of all offenses against the laws of the
United States"); United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 345 (1878) ("Such courts possess no
jurisdiction over crimes and offences committed against the authority of the United States, except
what is given to them by the power that created them; nor can they be invested with any such
jurisdiction beyond what the power ceded to the United States by the Constitution authorizes
Congress to confer, from which it follows that before an offence can become cognizable in the
Circuit Court the Congress must first define or recognize it as such, and affix a punishment to it,
and confer jurisdiction upon some court to try the offender.").
64. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 12.
65. Young v. Illinois, 6 Ill. App. 434, 434 (1880) (citing the 1870 Illinois Constitution's grant
of jurisdiction over "all causes in law and equity" and explaining that "[t]he criminal offense of
assault and battery duly charged is clearly a case at law").
66. After the 1964 amendments to the Illinois Constitution, see infra Part IB, the analogy
between federal trial court jurisdiction and Illinois trial court jurisdiction became even weaker.
See Jeffrey A. Parness, American General Jurisdiction Trial Courts: New Visions, New
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Second, the void sentence rule was founded on the theory that an
order that does not conform to statute is entirely void, 67 i.e., "from its
inception a complete nullity and without legal effect." 68 The idea that a
long-settled sentence may become not just erroneous, but entirely void,
creates intolerable paradoxes in the law. For example, since "[t]he final
judgment in a criminal case is the sentence," 69 and since (with limited
exceptions not relevant here 7 0 ) only final orders are appealable in
Illinois criminal cases,71 what happens to a direct appeal following a
sentence that has been retroactively declared never to have occurred?
The void sentence rule logically compels the very strange result that
once a sentencing judgment is retroactively erased, any appeal from that
judgment would also be erased.7 2 Or, as another example, what should
happen in the case of a convict sentenced to six years' imprisonment
when the law limits his sentence to five years? At the expiration of his
fifth year of incarceration, may the convict assume the self-help remedy
of escape and avoid prosecution for escape on the ground that his illegal
sentence actually never existed? Illinois courts have yet to reconcile, or
even address, these analytical difficulties created by the void sentence
rule.
The third and fourth problems with the void sentence rule were
addressed in Justice Joseph N. Carter's prescient dissenting opinion in
Siman. In his dissent, Justice Carter first noted the majority's failure to
Guidelines, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 189, 204 n. 118 (2006) (distinguishing federal trial courts of
limited jurisdiction from Illinois trial courts of general jurisdiction).
67. People ex rel. Maglori v. Siman, 119 N.E. 940, 942 (111. 1918) ("If such court or judge had
no jurisdiction to render the judgment and sentence complained of, the judgment is void .... ).
The remedy the court in Siman devised for this problem was that only the excess portion of a
sentence would be considered void. However, the rationale for the void sentence rule is not
limited to the correction of excessive sentences; it also provides the State a remedy for illegally
lenient sentences. See People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433, 433 (Ill. 2000) (relying on the void
sentence rule to vindicate the State's request to have an illegally lenient sentence corrected on
review even though the State may not normally challenge a defendant's sentence on appeal).
Interestingly, modern articulations of the void sentence rule often omit any qualification that only
the excess part of a sentence will be considered void. E.g., People v. Petrenko, 931 N.E.2d 1198,
1206 (Ill. 2010) ("It is well settled that a sentence that is in conflict with statutory guidelines is
void and may be challenged at any time.").
68. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 827 N.E.2d 422, 428 (Ill. 2005).
69. People v. Partee, 530 N.E.2d 460, 463 (Ill. 1988).
70. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 604 (listing particular types of orders that may be appealed even if not
final).
71. E.g., In re Justin L.V., 882 N.E.2d 621, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) ("Except where an Illinois
Supreme Court rule provides for an interlocutory appeal, [the Illinois Appellate Court] has
jurisdiction to review only final judgments.").
72. Cf In re Marriage of Duggan, 877 N.E.2d 1140, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (O'Malley, J.,
concurring) (questioning whether retroactive rescission of a judgment's finality voids any prior
appeals from the newly non-final judgment).
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distinguish two distinct concepts: jurisdiction-the "authority to hear
and decide a cause," which authority "[did] not depend upon the
correctness of the decision made"-and the correctness of the ultimate
order entered by a court vested with jurisdiction. 73 As Justice Carter
observed, precedent had theretofore held that "[i]f an error has been
committed by the court in the trial of the cause or in the sentence of the
petitioner, that is a question which may be reviewed by a [direct
appeal], but the party has no right to a writ of habeas corpus," 74 i.e., no
right to challenge the error after the party has exhausted its direct
appeals. The Siman majority improperly expanded the concept of
jurisdiction to include the authority to order a particular remedy.
The second, and related, problem Justice Carter raised in his Siman
dissent was that the Siman majority's ruling would lead to practical
difficulties. As Justice Carter rightly wondered, "[i]fjurisdiction should
be defined as it has been in the [majority] opinion, then every act of the
court that goes beyond the authority of the court to enter it [would be]
void." 75 Thus, under the void sentence rule in Siman, there would be no
real distinction between erroneous and void judgments. As Justice
Carter predicted, Illinois courts invoking the void sentence rule in the
ensuing century would struggle with the impossible task of
distinguishing simple errors, which are merely voidable and correctable
73. People ex rel. Maglori v. Siman, 119 N.E. 940, 944 (Ill. 1918) (Carter, J., dissenting)
(quoting People v. Talmadge, 61 N.E. 1049, 1050 (Ill. 1901)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts in other states have recognized this distinction. See People v. Ramirez, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d
340, 346 (Ct. App. 2008) (distinguishing between lack of jurisdiction, which makes a judgment
void, and an act in excess of jurisdiction, which makes the judgment only voidable so that an
objection to the judgment can be waived); Myers v. Commonwealth, 42 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Ky.
2001) (rejecting the argument that an erroneous sentence creates a jurisdictional problem because
"[o]nce jurisdiction has properly attached ... jurisdiction is not lost just because the court makes
a mistake in determining the facts, the law, or both"); DeShields v. State, 132 P.3d 540, 543
(Mont. 2006) ("Whether a district court commits a statutory error in imposing a sentence must not
be confused with whether the court had the power or capacity to impose a sentence."); State v.
Johnston, 510 S.E.2d 423, 425 (S.C. 1999) ("[T]his Court, in discussing error preservation, has
specifically distinguished a trial court's sentencing authority from its subject matter
jurisdiction."). All of these states have trial courts of general, rather than limited, jurisdiction.
See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10 ("Superior courts have original jurisdiction in all other causes.");
KY. CONST. § 112(5) ("The Circuit Court shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes
not vested in some other court."); MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 4(1) ("The district court has original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to felony and all civil matters and cases at law and in
equity."); S.C. CONST. art. V, § 11 ("The Circuit Court shall be a general trial court with original
jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, except those cases in which exclusive jurisdiction shall be
given to inferior courts .... ).
74. Siman, 119 N.E. at 944 (Carter, J., dissenting) (quoting People ex rel. Huber v. Whitman,
115 N.E. 531, 532 (Ill. 1917) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing People ex rel. Harris v.
Graves, 114 N.E. 556, 556 (Ill. 1916))).
75. Id.
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only on direct appeal, from erroneous judgments, which are void and
correctable at any time. 76
Nonetheless, Justice Carter's warnings went unheeded; in fact, his
dissent was never cited in any subsequent court decision. 77 In People ex
rel. Carlstrom v. Eller,7 8 a decision announced soon after Siman, the

Illinois Supreme Court appeared to backtrack from, and even repudiate,
the Siman rationale by reasoning that, in Eller, "[t]he criminal court,
which pronounced the sentence in question, had jurisdiction of the
[defendant] and of the subject-matter of the suit, and while the statutory
penalty for the crime . . . is fine or imprisonment, and not both, . . . it

was error to inflict both punishments"; however, "the judgment was not
void, but was a valid judgment of conviction for the crime" and could
not be collaterally attacked. 79 Despite this reasoning, which was
diametrically contrary to the reasoning on which the court in Siman
based its holding, the court in Eller interpreted Siman to mean that the
criminal court's sentence "was not entirely void, but was simply
excessive" so that only the illegal portion of the sentence "was the
excessive and void part of the judgment."80 Thus, the court in Eller
purported to follow Siman at the same time it repudiated Siman's
reasoning; the Eller court offered no reason why the excess portion of a
sentence should be considered void other than the jurisdictional reasons
espoused in Siman.
Despite Justice Carter's reservations, and despite the problems
implied (but superficially reconciled) by Eller, Illinois common law
began to accept without further scrutiny Siman's broad definition of
jurisdiction as including the authority to enter a particular judgment.
The rule was thus repeated, 8 ' and then repeated again, 82 and again, 83
76. See People v. Davis, 619 N.E.2d 750, 754 (Ill. 1993). In Davis, the Illinois Supreme Court
bemoaned courts' failures to differentiate between voidable and void judgments, but, in its own
clarification of the matter, the Court indiscriminately cited outdated and current principles of
circuit court jurisdiction. See id. at 754-55 (citing the Illinois 1970 Constitution, but then citing
jurisdictional precedent-Armstrong v. Obucino, 133 N.E. 58, 58 (Ill. 1921)--that predated the
constitutional change).
77. The only authority to have noticed Justice Carter's dissent was a law review case note that
opined that Justice Carter had the better view of the case. Current Note, 28 YALE L.J. 292, 292
(1919) ("The view of Mr. Justice Carter, that the sentence was not beyond the power of the court
but merely erroneous, seems preferable.. . .Prior Illinois cases seem to sustain that view.").
78. 153 N.E. 597 (Ill. 1926).
79. Id. at 599.
80. Id. (discussingSiman, 119 N.E. 940).
81. People ex rel. Modem Woodmen of Am. v. Cir. Ct. of Wash. Cnty., 179 N.E. 441, 444
(Ill. 1932) (citing Armstrong, 133 N.E. at 59; Siman, 119 N.E. at 942, and cases cited therein;
People v. Super. Ct., 84 N.E. 875, 877-78 (Ill. 1908)).
82. People ex rel. Weed v. Whipp, 186 N.E. 135, 136 (Ill. 1933) (citing Modern Woodmen of
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and again, 84 until its verity was sustained by sheer repetition alone. By
1964, any concerns with the void sentence rule had faded from thought.
B. A DeeperProblemfor the Void Sentence Rule-Amendments to the
Illinois Constitution

Even if the original problems underlying the void sentence rule-and
its presumption that a circuit court had no jurisdictional authority to
impose a criminal sentence beyond that described in a statute-had
been overlooked, a new, more fundamental problem arose in 1964 when
the Illinois Constitution was amended to effect wholesale changes in
circuit court jurisdiction. These changes should have vitiated the void
sentence rule, but, as with the original problems, they went largely
unnoticed as Illinois courts continued to repeat their previous mistake.
1. The 1964 Amendments and How They (Should Have) Affected the
Void Sentence Rule
In response to the administrative difficulties engendered by the
confusing system of often overlapping courts of limited jurisdiction
spawned by the 1870 Constitution, the constitution's judicial article was
amended, effective in 1964, to set forth an entirely new jurisdictional
scheme. 85 The new judicial article eliminated the labyrinthine system
of inferior courts in favor of a single, unified circuit court,86 upon which
the article conferred "unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable
matters, and such powers of review of administrative action as may be
provided by law." 87 This change largely alleviated the jurisdictional

Am., 179 N.E. at 446; Eller, 153 N.E. at 599; Siman, 119 N.E. at 942; People ex rel. Busch v.
Green, 117 N.E. 764, 766-67 (Ill. 1917)).
83. People ex rel.Barrett v. Sbarbaro, 54 N.E.2d 559, 563 (Ill. 1944) (citing federal law).
84. People v. Hamlett, 96 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ill. 1951) (citing Whipp, 186 N.E. at 136).
85. CORNELIUS, supra note 10, at 131 ("The amendment submitted to the voters in 1962 was
intended to simplify the judicial system by centralizing its administration and eliminating
overlapping jurisdictions."). Voters, divided between Cook County (largely in favor of the
amendment) and the rest of the state (largely opposed), passed the amendments in November
1962, and they took effect on January 1, 1964. FIEDLER, supra note 11, at 262.
86. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, historical note at 9 (West 1964) (noting that the form of the
ballot informed voters that the amendment to the judicial article would "give the state an
integrated court system in which all judicial power would be vested in three levels of courts: the
Supreme, Appellate, and Circuit Courts"); DAVID R. MILLER, 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
ANNOTATED FOR LEGISLATORS 53 (4th ed. 1996) (regarding the 1970 Constitution, which did

not alter the structure created by the 1964 amendments, "[aill trial-level judicial functions have
been consolidated in the circuit courts").
87. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 9 (amended 1964). See generally Harry G. Fins, Reexamination of "Jurisdiction" in Light of New Illinois Judicial Article, 53 ILL. B.J. 8 (1964)

(discussing the changes wrought by the 1964 amendment).
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problems that, until then, had plagued the Illinois court system.88 Six
years later, when Illinois adopted its current constitution, the
Constitution of 1970, it left the court system largely unchanged from
that provided for in the 1964 amendments. 89 The current constitution
provides that "Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction" and that "Circuit Courts shall have such power to
review administrative action as provided by law." 90
The revolutionary significance of this change, if not immediately
apparent, was finally explained at length thirty-eight years later in the
Illinois Supreme Court's landmark 2002 decision in Belleville Toyota,
Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. 9 1 In Belleville Toyota, the

defendants argued that a statute of limitations constituted a
"jurisdictional prerequisite to the plaintiff's right to sue" (or, put more
precisely, a jurisdictional prerequisite to a court's authority to hear the
case). 92 The court took this argument as an invitation to clarify the
import of the post-1964 constitutional scheme for circuit court
jurisdiction. It first defined subject matter jurisdiction as "the power of
a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceeding in question belongs," 93 a definition that, notably, does not
include the "power to render a particular judgment" adjunct that had
insinuated itself into pre-1964 case law. 94 The court then observed that,
under the current scheme, Illinois circuit courts' authority in nonadministrative actions "is conferred entirely by [the] state constitution"
and extends over all "justiciable matters." 95 As the Supreme Court
explained in Belleville Toyota, the amendments marked a "stark contrast
to the significant role previously exercised by the legislature" under
former constitutional schemes, 96 and "radically changed the
legislature's role in determining the jurisdiction of the circuit court." 97
88.

ILL.

CONSTITUTION

RESEARCH

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

GRP.,

199 (1970)

CON-CON:

ISSUES

FOR

THE

ILLINOIS

("Most Illinois jurisdictional problems were

eliminated with the passage of the 1964 amendment.").
89. MILLER, supra note 86, at 49 ("The 1970 Constitution essentially kept that court system
but made some changes, especially in the powers of the Illinois Supreme Court and the structure
of the judicial disciplinary system.").
90. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
91. 770 N.E.2d 177 (lll. 2002).
92. Id at 183.
93. Id at 184.
94. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (explaining the problems with defining
jurisdiction as the power to render a particular judgment).
95. Belleville Toyota, 770 N.E.2d at 184 (citing ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9).
96. Id. at 185.
97. Id. at 186.
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Aside from its ability to "create new justiciable matters by enacting
legislation that creates rights and duties that have no counterpart at
common law or in equity," 98 the legislature retained no authority to
control court jurisdiction in non-administrative actions. 99
This revelation brought with it immense ramifications for the
jurisdictional principles announced in case law predating the 1964
amendments. It rendered obsolete case law premised on the idea that
courts exercised limited or statutory jurisdiction,100 as well as related
case law holding that "unless the statutory requirements were satisfied,
a court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested."'0o It thus
repudiated the then-prevalent theory that the legislature could impose
"conditions precedent" to circuit court jurisdiction by inserting statutory
conditions on liability.' 02 As the Illinois Supreme Court explained in
another case, Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher,103 the amendments to the
judicial article also eviscerated the previously extant "'inherent
authority' requirement," which applies now only to "courts of limited
jurisdiction and administrative agencies."104
Accordingly, for the parties in Belleville Toyota, because the
legislature had no power to abridge the jurisdiction of the courts, the
statute of limitations was not a jurisdictional bar that could render a
circuit court judgment void.105 Instead, statute-of-limitations problems,
like any other discrepancy between a circuit court ruling and a relevant
statute, created errors correctable on direct appeal but not jurisdictional
problems that could allow the case to be reopened even after the appeal
process was exhausted.
As Belleville Toyota and Steinbrecher make clear, many of the

above-discussed ideas regarding circuit court jurisdiction, such as the
idea that courts exceeded their jurisdiction when they acted without
statutory authority, the idea that court decrees would be void if entered
without "inherent authority"1 06 conferred by the legislature, and the idea
that the legislature had power to curb circuit court jurisdiction, should
98. Id. at 184-85.
99. Id. at 185.

100. Id. at 186 ("In light of these changes, the precedential value of case law which examines
64
judicial system is necessarily limited to the
a court's jurisdiction under the pre-19
arose.").
cases
those
constitutional context in which
101. Id. at 185.
102. Id.
103. 759 N.E.2d 509 (Ill. 2001).
104. Id. at 518-19.
105. Belleville Toyota, 770 N.E.2d at 186-88.

106. For a note on the phrase "inherent authority," see supra note 49.
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have collapsed upon the adoption of the 1964 constitutional revisions to
circuit court jurisdiction. Since these ideas were the very foundation of
the void sentence rule, the rule should have collapsed with them;
indeed, Steinbrecher expressly repudiated several of the cases on which
the void sentence rule was premised. 107 The void sentence rule
persisted nonetheless.
2. Illinois Courts Ignore the Constitutional Amendments
a. The Constitutional Change Was Generally Ignored
Instead of reconsidering the jurisdictional principles on which the
common law had relied under previous constitutional judicial systems,
Illinois courts continued to repeat them without taking notice of the
constitutional changes that should have rendered them obsolete. 108
Thus, Illinois case law is now littered with decisions that continue to
hold, based on pre-1964 ideas of limited jurisdiction, that the concept of
subject matter jurisdiction includes not only the power of a court to hear
and decide a justiciable matter but also the power to render the
particular judgment entered.
The Illinois Appellate Court's 1984 decision in People ex rel. Illinois
Department of Human Rights v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp.109

typifies the problem. In Arlington Park, the appellate court determined
that the circuit court had improperly entered a permanent injunction in a
case brought under a statute that contemplated only temporary relief.1 10
The court cited a 1930 Illinois Supreme Court decision, without
acknowledging the intervening fundamental constitutional changes, for
the proposition that "if a court is one of general jurisdiction, when its
power to act in a particular matter is controlled by statute, the court is
governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction." 1 ' Having invoked the
107. Steinbrecher, 759 N.E.2d at 518-19 (explaining the obsolescence of, among other cases,
In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702 (Ill. 1993), People v. Wade, 506 N.E.2d 954 (111. 1987), and
Armstrong v. Obucino, 133 N.E. 58 (Ill. 1921)). Steinbrecher tempered its repudiation with
language that was construed to save the void sentence rule. See infra notes 154-72 and
accompanying text.
108. Belleville Toyota marked a concerted effort to correct the pervasive failure of bench and
bar to take note of the constitutional shift begun in 1964. Belleville Toyota cited and explicitly
overruled several opinions that had overlooked the constitutional change and had instead relied on
decisions based on the previous constitutional scheme. See Belleville Toyota, 770 N.E.2d at 186
("Nonetheless, pre-1964 rules of law continue to be cited by Illinois courts, without qualification,
creating confusion and imprecision in the case law."). It implicitly overruled many more
opinions it did not mention.
109. 461 N.E.2d 505 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
110. Idat507-08.
111. Id. at 508 (citing Brown v. VanKeuren, 172 N.E. 1,3 (Ill. 1930)).
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obsolete concepts of limited jurisdiction, the court pressed forward in
the same vein by relying on a 1938 Illinois Supreme Court case for the
notion that "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction includes not only the power to
hear and determine a class of cases . . . but the power to grant the

particular relief requested."ll 2 The propositions for which Arlington
Park cited the 1930 case and the 1938 case were based explicitly on
concepts of limited or statutory jurisdiction that were long outdated by
the time the Illinois Appellate Court decided Arlington Park.1 13
Unfortunately, Arlington Park is no forgotten aberration; in fact, it
was later repeated and amplified. Nine years after the Illinois Appellate
Court issued Arlington Park,the Illinois Supreme Court endorsed it in
In re MM,114 an opinion that, remarkably, both explains and disregards
the 1964 shift in Illinois law on jurisdiction. In MM., the Supreme
Court considered "whether the circuit court, when terminating parental
rights and appointing a guardian with power to consent to adoption,
may condition the guardian's power to consent" when the relevant
statute contemplated no such conditions.115 The court answered that
question in the negative, on the basis that adoption is "statutorily
derived" and thus that the circuit court's authority in adoption
proceedings "derives exclusively from statute." 1 6 One paragraph after
declaring, erroneously, that the circuit court derived its authority from
statute, the court acknowledged the appellants' argument that the circuit
court did not lack jurisdiction because, under the 1970 Constitution, the
circuit court enjoyed "original jurisdiction over all justiciable
matters." 117 The court even acknowledged the rule that "[t]he circuit
court now derives its jurisdiction directly from the Constitution and not
from any statute or pleading."11 s However, the court made no attempt
to reconcile, or even acknowledge the tension between these competing
rules. Instead, in the very next paragraph, after citing the new concepts
of jurisdiction that rendered principles of limited jurisdiction obsolete,
112. Id. (citing J.L. Simmons Co. v. Capital Dev. Bd., 424 N.E.2d 821, 822 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) (citing Thayer v. Vill. of Downers Grove, 16 N.E.2d 717, 719 (111.1938))).
113. See Brown, 172 N.E. at 3 ("Whatever the rank of the court exercising a special statutory
jurisdiction, it is governed by the same rules as courts of limited jurisdiction."); Thayer, 16
N.E.2d at 719 ("Where the court entering the judgment has exceeded its jurisdiction and such
judgment or decree transcends the statute conferring jurisdiction on the court, such judgment or
decree is void.").
114. 619 N.E.2d 702 (Ill. 1993).
115. Id. at 705.
116. Id at 709.
117. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id (quoting McGinnis Plumbing Co. v. Zeus Dev. Corp., 457 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the court returned to those familiar obsolete principles and reiterated the
rule that "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to
adjudge concerning the general question involved . . . as well as the

power to grant the particular relief requested."ll 9 For this principle,
MM relied on Arlington Park as well as on case law based on Modern
Woodmen ofAmerica v. Circuit Court of Washington County,120 a 1931

Illinois Supreme Court decision applying antiquated concepts of limited

jurisdiction. 12 1

Having invoked the outdated concepts of limited jurisdiction, then
quoted the modern constitutional tenets that contradicted those rules,
and then restated the old rules, the court in MM wavered yet again in
its next paragraph, to offer, "[i]n the interest of clarity," that, "[w]ith the
exception of administrative review actions, where jurisdiction is
conferred upon the circuit court by the legislature, jurisdiction is
conferred by [the] constitution." 22 The court's fealty to clarity was
short-lived, however, because it went on to explain that "[j]uvenile
court proceedings qualify as special statutory proceedings," and thus
any circuit court action in derogation of relevant statutes on the matter
"exceed[s] [the court's] statutory authority." 23
The confusing, internally incongruous, and largely misleading
decision in MM 2 4 continues to muddle the law; it and Arlington Park
spawned a litany of court decisions that cited their misguided
119. Id.
120. 179 N.E. 441 (111.1931).
121. In re MM, 619 N.E.2d at 709 (citing People ex rel. Rice v. App. Ct., 268 N.E.2d 420,
421 (Ill. 1971); People ex rel. Ill. Dep't of Human Rights v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp.,
461 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); J.L. Simmons Co v. Capital Dev. Bd., 424 N.E.2d 821,
821 (111. App. Ct. 1981)). J.L. Simmons Co. was cited in Arlington Park. See supra note 112.
Rice relied on Modern Woodmen, which was one of the cases in the progeny of Siman. See supra

notes 81-82.
122. In re MM, 619 N.E.2d at 709.
123. Id. at 710. This holding was, of course, based on concepts of limited jurisdiction and on
authority predating the 1964 constitutional amendments. See id. (citing People v. Piccolo, 114
N.E. 145, 145 (Ill. 1916); In re Sneed, 363 N.E.2d 37, 41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); In re Dependency
of Rosmis, 167 N.E.2d 826, 828 (I. App. Ct. 1960)). The Supreme Court cited Sneed, the only
case decided after the 1964 amendments, for the proposition that "in a special statutory
proceeding, the court could exercise no power not specially given" by the statute. Id.
The Court in MM also attempted to justify its result by stating it in terms of the legislature's
defining a "justiciable matter," but that effort, too, was clouded by the Court's reliance on rules of
limited jurisdiction from case law predating the 1964 constitutional amendments, see id (citing
Brown v. VanKeuren, 172 N.E. 1, 3 (Ill. 1930)), or from cases involving administrative review,
the only area in which the concept of limited jurisdiction survives, see id. (citing Freedman Bros.
Furniture Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 486 N.E.2d 893, 895-96 (Ill. 1985)).
124. A concurring opinion in MM pointed out the majority's contravention of modem
jurisdictional law. Id. at 714 (Miller, J., concurring).
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formulations of Illinois law on jurisdiction. 125 Some authority that
relied on MM was subsequently overruled in Belleville Toyota,126
which also implicitly rejected MM's premise that the legislature may
curtail circuit court jurisdiction 2 7 and thus implicitly overruled MM12 8
However, Belleville Toyota stopped short of explicitly overruling MM
and, accordingly, did not stunt MM's influence, which continues to
grow.
What is worse, MM's discussion of jurisdiction was almost entirely
gratuitous. MM was a direct appeal from the circuit court's judgments,
not a collateral attack on them. The circuit court's violation of the
statute was an error that was quite correctable on direct appeal even if
the circuit court had jurisdiction to make the error. 129 Thus, when the
appellants argued that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to enter the
orders in derogation of a statute, the Supreme Court should have
rejected the argument as irrelevant and instead considered whether the
125. All of the following cases cite either Arlington Park, 461 N.E.2d 505, or MM, 619
N.E.2d 702, or cite cases in their progeny, for the notion that jurisdiction includes the power to
render a particular judgment and/or can be limited by statute: People v. Brown, 866 N.E.2d 1163,
1169 (111.2007); In re Jaime P., 861 N.E.2d 958, 966 (Ill. 2006); In re A.H., 748 N.E.2d 183, 188
(111. 2001); In re Estate of Gebis, 710 N.E.2d 385, 387 (ll. 1999); Am. Mgmt. Consultant, LLC v.
Carter, 915 N.E.2d 411, 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); In re Dontrell H., 888 N.E.2d 627, 631 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2008); In re Gilberto G.-P., 873 N.E.2d 534, 537-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); In re D.D., 788
N.E.2d 10, 20-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); In re O.H., 768 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); CPM
Prods., Inc. v. Mobb Deep, Inc., 742 N.E.2d 393, 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); In re Marriage of
Fields, 681 N.E.2d 166, 170 (111.App. Ct. 1997); In Interest of M.V., 681 N.E.2d 532, 534-35
(111.App. Ct. 1997); In Interest of Rami M., 673 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); In re
Chiara C., 665 N.E.2d 404, 406-07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); In re Estate of Austwick, 656 N.E.2d
779, 786 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Estate of Nelson, 621 N.E.2d 81, 84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re
Ardedia L., 618 N.E.2d 804, 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Deking v. Urban Inv. & Dev. Co., 508
N.E.2d 377, 379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Although most of these opinions seem unaware that they
cling to outdated law, others are more purposeful. In Gilberto G.-P., the majority opinion cites
rules derived from a limited jurisdiction scheme in spite of both a special concurrence pointing
out the conflict with the current constitution, see 873 N.E.2d at 538-40 (Grometer, J.,
concurring), and one of the parties citing current constitutional principles, see id. at 538. The
Gilberto G.-P. majority addressed the party's constitutional argument with the single, conclusory,
and incorrect retort that the party's citation to current constitutional principles did not "address
the specific statutory exclusion of jurisdiction contained" in the statute. Id at 538.
126. Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 177, 185 (Ill.
2002) (overruling In re Marriage of Fields, 681 N.E.2d 166 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)).
127. See id. (rejecting the view that "the circuit court may exercise only that jurisdiction
which the legislature allows").
128. In re Alex T., 873 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) ("We deem the supreme court
to have largely overruled MM in Steinbrecher, the earliest of [three cases including Belleville
Toyota]."); see also id at 1017 n.1 (explaining that Belleville Toyota disapproved of the majority

opinion in MM and actually relied on the idea expressed in the special concurrence).
129. Indeed, the concurring opinion in MM comes quite close to making this very point. See
619 N.E.2d at 714 (Miller, J., concurring) ("[Tihe constitutional source of a circuit court's
jurisdiction does not carry with it a license to disregard the language of a statute.").
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deviation from the statute constituted reversible error. If the Supreme
Court in MM had so explained, without resorting unnecessarily to
concepts of jurisdiction, it could have avoided perpetuating a flaw in the
common law. 13 0 The Supreme Court's failure to take that path, paired
with its inaccurate analysis of the jurisdictional law it unnecessarily
discussed, places MM among the many opinions that have failed to
honor the 1964 amendments that shifted the landscape of Illinois circuit
court jurisdiction.
b. The Confusion Regarding the Amendments Extended to the Void
Sentence Rule
Illinois jurisprudence surrounding the void sentence rule tracked the
remainder of Illinois law following the 1964 constitutional
amendments: it persisted, heedless of the fundamental change effected
by those amendments. In 1971, the Illinois Supreme Court cited a 1951
opinion on the void sentence rule and applied it without further
analysis.131 In its next case to take up the void sentence rule, In re
T.E.,' 32 the Illinois Supreme Court engaged in a slightly more
protracted discussion that would form the basis of most current
articulations of the rule. 133 In T.E., after four minors' probation was
revoked, the court considered the effect on subsequent proceedings of
the original orders placing them on indefinite terms of probation when
the relevant statute contemplated only definite terms. 134 The minors
argued that the original orders were void and thus could be attacked at
any time. 135 The Supreme Court agreed. As in the many other
decisions resurrecting limited jurisdiction concepts that should have
130. The MM majority seems to have approached, but not quite reached, this realization.
Among its conflicting paragraphs addressing the appellants' argument is the following passage:
"Reasoning that the court's jurisdiction over this matter is constitutionally derived, appellants
suggest to us that the court may, therefore, proceed in derogation of the statute. The practical
effect of appellants' reasoning would render any statutory law a nullity. We, therefore, reject their
reasoning as unsound." Id. at 710 (majority opinion). The Court was correct that the appellants'
argument would nullify statutory law, but it then misidentified that revelation's effect on the case
at hand. Instead of responding that a circuit court's jurisdiction over a case does not protect its
errors from correction on direct appeal-the natural and correct response to the appellants'
argument-the Court responded that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment it
reached.
131. People v. Simkins, 268 N.E.2d 386, 389 (Ill. 1971) (citing People v. Hamlett, 96 N.E.2d
547, 550 (Ill. 1951)).
132. 423 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. 1981).
133. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. This is true despite the fact that TE. was a
case involving juvenile delinquency.
134. In re TE., 423 N.E.2d at 911; see also id. at 913 (concluding that the relevant statute did
not contemplate indefinite terms of probation).
135. Id. at 913.
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been put to rest with the 1964 constitutional amendments, the decision
in T.E. reached its result by relying on cases predating the 1964
amendments without taking any note of the jurisdictional change that
had taken place since those cases were decided. With those cases as
support, the court declared that "[tihe established rule is that where a
court having jurisdiction over both the person and the offense imposes a
sentence in excess of what the statute permits, the legal and authorized
portion of the sentence is not void, but the excess portion of the
sentence is void." 136 Thus, the Supreme Court held, "the [circuit]
courts lacked the statutory authority . . . to place the minors on an

indefinite term of probation" and its orders were "consequently void
and of no effect." 1 37
The opinion in T.E. drew a short but persuasive dissent from three of
the court's seven justices. 138 The dissent opined that it was "undisputed
that the [circuit] courts . .. had jurisdiction of the subject matter . .. and
of the persons . .. involved" and thus that the improper orders "were

simply errors, correctable like any other error, by appeal."1 39
Accordingly, the dissent would have held that "[t]he erroneous orders
were voidable, not void, and, no appeal having been taken, the errors
were waived."1 40 The three dissenting justices thus championed the
wholesale repudiation of what later developed into the void sentence
rule, so much so that they would have held that the imprisoned minors
had forgone their right to challenge their erroneous sentences.
A fourth justice, apparently the deciding vote in the case, penned a
separate concurrence in which he offered that "while the majority and
dissent express[ed] different views of jurisdiction . . . , by accepting
either approach the same result can be reached."1 41 This statement
136. Id (citing People v. Hamlett, 96 N.E.2d 547, 550 (111.1951); People ex rel. Barrett v.
Sbarbaro, 54 N.E.2d 559, 563 (111.1944); People v. Williams, 365 N.E.2d 404, 408 (Lll. App. Ct.
1977)). Although Williams postdates the 1964 constitutional amendments, it relies on Sbarbaro
for the statement for which TE. cited it. See Williams, 365 N.E.2d at 408 (quoting Sbarbaro, 54
N.E.2d at 563). Williams also offered Watson v. Auburn Iron Works, Inc., 318 N.E.2d 508 (111.

App. Ct. 1974), as additional support, but Watson, like Williams, relies on Sbarbaro. Thus, TE.'s
holding was based on the two previous Illinois Supreme Court cases, Sbarbaro and Hamlett.
Both, as stated, were decided when Illinois still employed a system of limited circuit court
jurisdiction. Hamlett relied on People ex rel. Weed v. Whipp, 186 N.E. 135 (lll. 1933), a case
within the progeny of People ex rel. Maglori v. Siman, 119 N.E. 940 (111. 1918). See supra notes
82 and 84. Barrett relied on federal authority, which, as explained above, is an improper analogy.
See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
137. In re TE., 423 N.E.2d at 914.
138. Id. at 915 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. (Simon, J., concurring).
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sounds a cautionary note against judicial compromise on the reasoning
used to reach a shared result. Whether the same result could have been
reached in that particular case regardless of the law on jurisdiction, the
choice of a particular line of reasoning in T.E. had consequences that
reached far beyond the result in that case. 142 By casting the void
sentence rule with the imprimatur of a majority opinion, the Illinois
Supreme Court perpetuated the rule in spite of the problems identified
in the dissent. Again, as was the case following Siman, subsequent
decisions repeated the law as stated in the TE. majority while ignoring
the dissent, and, by force of repetition, the void sentence rule became
boilerplate while the concerns raised in the TE. dissent faded into

obscurity. 14 3
3. The Current State of the Law
The result of this repetition is a void sentence rule so "well settled"
that it is cited, and accepted, without explanation. 144 The rule is,
however, an anomaly whose rationale-that a circuit court has no
authority to enter a sentence not delineated by statute-is a "vestige of a
now-supplanted constitutional scheme"l 45 and is unreservedly contrary
to the precept that circuit court jurisdiction flows not from statutes but
from the constitution. 14 6 Thus, while the void sentence rule itself has
become "settled," its effect on Illinois law has been anything but
settling. Indeed, as the void sentence rule advanced to permanence, it
left a bemused body of precedent straining unsuccessfully to reconcile
the rule with the remainder of Illinois law.
Despite its repeated efforts to clarify Illinois jurisdictional law, the
Illinois Supreme Court's jurisprudence has greatly exacerbated Illinois
courts' confusion regarding the current jurisdictional scheme. In
Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher,147 a property dispute case that set the
stage for Belleville Toyota's ultimate clarification of the reach of circuit

142. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., People v. Hauschild, 871 N.E.2d 1, 11 (111. 2007) (citing People v. Arna, 658
N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ill. 1995)); People v. Thompson, 805 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (lll. 2004) (citing
People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski, 748 N.E.2d 175, 179-80 (Ill. 2001); People v. Williams, 688
N.E.2d 1153, 1155 (Ill. 1997); Ama, 658 N.E.2d at 448; People v. Wade, 506 N.E.2d 954, 95556 (Ill. 1987); TE., 423 N.E.2d at 913; People v. Simmons, 628 N.E.2d 759, 760 (111.App. Ct.
1993); People v. Perruquet, 537 N.E.2d 351, 353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)).
2010).
144. People v. Petrenko, 931 N.E.2d 1198, 1207 (111.
145. People v. Sharifpour, 930 N.E.2d 529, 553 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (O'Malley, J.,
concurring).
146. See supra notes 85-107 and accompanying text.
147. 759 N.E.2d 509 (Ill. 2001).
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court jurisdiction under the current Illinois Constitution, 14 8 a majority of
the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the fallacious argument, advanced
by three dissenting justices, that a circuit court order was void for lack
of jurisdiction because it deviated from relevant statutory provisions. 14 9
To support the flawed argument that a circuit court loses jurisdiction
where it "fail[s] to follow the very statute empowering the court" 150 or
"exceed[s] its authority,"' 5 ' the Steinbrecher dissent cited several of the
cases underlying the void sentence rule, including most notably MM,
the oft-cited case discussed at length above,15 2 and Armstrong v.
Obucino, a 1921 case to which the modem incarnation of the void
sentence rule may be traced.15 3 In response, the majority explained that
these cases were rendered obsolete by the current constitution.154 If the
majority had stopped there, it might have bestowed much needed clarity
on Illinois jurisdictional law. However, the majority went on to
distinguish another of the dissent's jurisdiction authorities on the basis
that the decision "discusse[d] jurisdiction in the context of criminal
proceedings." 55 The majority continued: "Criminal proceedings that
involve the power to render judgments or sentences address a separate
set of concerns not at issue in the present matter." 56
This one statement-an offhand attempt to distinguish a criminal
case and an attempt that was unnecessary in light of the clear
constitutional principles the majority had already announced-forsook
whatever progress Steinbrecher might have compelled and instead
insulated the void sentence rule beneath a vague, amorphous reference
to "separate concerns" in criminal cases. After Steinbrecher,those few
courts that paused to consider the propriety of the void sentence rule
148. See In re Alex T., 873 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (identifying Steinbrecher,
759 N.E.2d 509, as the first of three decisions in the "Belleville Toyota trio" of opinions). The
third case of the Belleville Toyota trio, People ex rel. Grafv. Village of Lake Bluff 975 N.E.2d
281 (Ill. 2003), came after Belleville Toyota.
149. Steinbrecher,759 N.E.2d at 518-20.
150. Id at 526.
151. Id (quoting People v. Davis, 619 N.E.2d 750, 754 (111.1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
152. See supra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
153. See Steinbrecher,759 N.E.2d at 526-27 (citing People v. Arna, 658 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ill.
1995); People v. Wade, 506 N.E.2d 954, 955-56 (Ill. 1987); Armstrong v. Obucino, 133 N.E. 58,
59-60 (111.1921); see also supra note 4 (tracking Armstrong's influence on the void sentence
rule).
154. Steinbrecher,759 N.E.2d at 518-19 (repudiating In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702 (Ill. 1993);
Wade, 506 N.E.2d 954; Armstrong, 133 N.E. 58).
155. Id. at 520 (quoting People v. Davis, 619 N.E.2d 750, 754 (Ill. 1993)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
156. Id.
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confronted not only the rule's tension with the Illinois Constitution but
also language from Steinbrecher distinguishing the jurisdictional
principles at play in criminal sentencing cases from those at play in all
other cases.
For example, in In re Alex T., 15 7 the Illinois Appellate Court
addressed the question of whether a circuit court order forcing the
respondent's involuntary admission to a mental health facility was void
for lack of jurisdiction because the relevant statute purported to deny the
circuit court jurisdiction under the facts of the case.158 The court
identified its "primary concern" as reconciling the statute with the
current constitution's provision granting circuit courts general
jurisdiction over all justiciable matters. 159 However, relying on
Steinbrecher, as well as People v. McCarty,160 another Supreme Court
decision that suggested a criminal-civil distinction for jurisdictional
purposes,1 61 the court concluded that any order "significantly restricting
a person's liberty" requires "statutory authorization" in order "for a
court to have jurisdiction to enter it." 1 62 This attempted distinction
between criminal and civil cases, however, is ultimately untenable,
because the Illinois Constitution grants the circuit court jurisdiction over
all justiciable matters without distinguishing criminal cases. 163 Indeed,
the Illinois Supreme Court has stated in criminal cases the same
jurisdictional principles of general circuit court jurisdiction that it
explained in Belleville Toyota.164 However, even though the distinction
157. 873 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
158. The statute at issue stated that "[t]he circuit court has jurisdiction under this Chapter over
persons not charged with a felony who are subject to involuntary admission," and the respondent
had been charged with a felony. Id. at 1016 (quoting 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-100 (2004)).

159. Id. (citing ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9; People ex rel. Graf v. Vill. of Lake Bluff, 795 N.E.2d
281, 286-88 (Ill. 2003); Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 770 N.E.2d
177, 186 (Ill. 2002); Steinbrecher, 759 N.E.2d at 518).
160. 445 N.E.2d 298 (Ill. 1983).
161. McCarty stated, "[A] conviction or an order significantly restricting the liberty of a
defendant must have statutory authorization and is a nullity otherwise." Id. at 303. In its
discussion of that issue, McCarty relied on pre-1964 case law, see id. (citing People v. Edge, 94
N.E.2d 359, 362 (Ill. 1950)), and TE. and its progeny, see id. (citing In re R.R., 442 N.E.2d 252,
253 (Ill. 1982) (citing TE., 423 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ill. 1981)); In re TE., 423 N.E.2d at 914. T.E.
is discussed supra at notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
162. InreAlex T., 873 N.E.2dat 1019.
163. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9; In re Nathan A.C., 904 N.E.2d 112, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)
("The 1970 Illinois Constitution does not differentiate between civil and criminal subject-matter
jurisdiction.").
164. See, e.g., People v. P.H., 582 N.E.2d 700, 705 (Ill. 1991) ("The Illinois Constitution
provides that all circuit courts have original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters except where
the supreme court is specified to have original and exclusive jurisdiction."); see also In re Luis
R., 941 N.E.2d 136, 140-42 (Ill. 2010) (applying Belleville Toyota's teachings to a juvenile
delinquency case).
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between criminal and civil jurisdiction has no legal basis, the fact that
Illinois case law has proposed it illustrates Illinois courts' confusion
with the void sentence rule.
A later Illinois Appellate Court decision, In re Nathan A.C., 16 5
recognized the problem with the distinction upon which Alex T
relied1 66 and attempted its own reconciliation. Relying on a special
concurrence from another decision, the Nathan A.C. court reasoned that
the discrepancy between Belleville Toyota and decisions that seemed to
ignore Belleville Toyota could be explained by parsing "jurisdiction"
into three separate issues: "(1) personal jurisdiction-or power over the
individual; (2) subject[-]matter jurisdiction-or the ability to entertain a
particular type of case; and (3) the power to render a particular
disposition."1 6 7 Nathan A.C. suggested that Belleville Toyota, unlike

some seemingly conflicting decisions that held jurisdiction was
controlled by statute, did not implicate the third type of jurisdictional
issue. 168 That is, according to Nathan A.C., in Belleville Toyota "the
statutory provisions the trial court purportedly failed to comply with did
not define the power to render a particular decision."l 69
Although Nathan A.C. was right to question the civil-criminal
distinction cited in Alex T, its own attempted reconciliation fares no
better. To harmonize the law on this point, Nathan A.C. resurrected the
"power to render a particular decision" adjunct the Illinois Supreme
Court had conspicuously omitted from its definition of "jurisdiction" in
Belleville Toyota.170 The Supreme Court discarded this adjunct for
good reason: it had no legitimate basis in Illinois law, 171 it conflated a
court's power to hear a case (jurisdiction) with its power to reach a
particular result,172 and it created an inscrutable distinction between
regular errors and errors that implicate a court's "power to render a
particular decision."1 73
As Alex T. and Nathan A.C demonstrate, the void sentence rule's
survival, in the face of constitutional principles that should have
eviscerated it, has left Illinois jurisdictional law a hodgepodge of
165. 904 N.E.2d 112.
166. Id. at 120 (criticizing In re Alex T., 873 N.E.2d 1015).
167. Id. (quoting In re Gilberto G.-P., 873 N.E.2d 534, 539 (111. App. Ct. 2007) (Grometer, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
168. Id. at 121.
169. Id.
170. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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irreconcilable ideas. So long as the void sentence rule persists, it will
continue to undermine any efforts-including the Illinois Supreme
Court's efforts in Belleville Toyota and related cases 1 74-to clarify the
The Supreme Court's attempted
state's jurisdictional principles.
corrections will never fully take hold until they are no longer forced to
compete with the void sentence rule. Thus, this study of Illinois law
leads inexorably to but one conclusion: the Illinois Supreme Court must
recognize, as the dissenting opinions in Siman and T.E. recognized from
the start, that the void sentence rule has no basis in Illinois law and
should be repudiated.
This solution, however, raises a new problem. Although the abolition
of the void sentence rule would clear away the morass of incongruous
jurisdictional law described above, it would also offend the normative
principle, set forth at the outset of this article, that parties should enjoy
the right to challenge an illegal sentence at any time. Indeed, as Siman
and T.E. demonstrate, even in the face of argument irrefutably
demonstrating the error of the void sentence rule, Illinois courts have
refused to renounce it where doing so would leave parties with no
vehicle for challenging improper sentences. Hence, as a practical
matter, renunciation is but half of the solution; the other half requires
that the void sentence rule be replaced with some workable basis for
allowing collateral attacks on improper sentences. Accordingly, either
to replace Illinois' void sentence rule or, more likely, to provoke Illinois
courts' repudiation of the rule, some new basis for correcting sentences
must be emplaced. As will be seen, the Illinois legislature could
provide just such a new basis very easily.
III. APPROACHES TAKEN IN OTHER STATES

Even if its void sentence rule cannot withstand scrutiny, Illinois
hardly stands alone in its ultimate view that an improper sentence may
be challenged at any time. Such challenges may be made by a
defendant, and sometimes by the State or by the court itself, in federal
courts, 175 as well as courts in every state except Arkansas, 176
174. See In re Alex T., 873 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (referencing the "Belleville
Toyota trio" of opinions); see also In re Luis R., 941 N.E.2d 136, 140 (Ill. 2010) (reiterating the
holding of Belleville Toyota).
175. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time."); Hill v.
United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962) ("Rule 35 ... permit[s] correction at any time of an
illegal sentence . . . .").
176. Arkansas has a statute providing, "Any circuit court, upon receipt of petition by the
aggrieved party for relief and after notice of the relief has been served on the prosecuting
attorney, may correct an illegal sentence at any time . . . ." ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-111(a)
(West 2010); see Reeves v. State, 5 S.W.3d 41, 44 (Ark. 1999) ("Our statutes provide that a
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Arizona, 17 7 and Maine.178 A survey of those jurisdictions' rationales
for correcting erroneous sentences provides several alternatives-some
workable, some not-to Illinois' current voidness rationale for
correcting improper sentences.
A. Other-StateApproaches that Would Not Work in Illinois
Of the states that allow challenges to improper sentences at any time,
relatively few base their positions on concepts of jurisdiction and
voidness. However, those few states that do rely on jurisdiction and
voidness principles-Alabama,1'7 Montana, 180 Ohio,181 Oregon,182 and
circuit court may correct an illegal sentence at any time."). However, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has ruled that the statute is superseded by a court rule setting forth a time limitation. State
v. Wilmoth, 255 S.W. 419, 424 (Ark. 2007).
177. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 24.3 ("The court may correct any unlawful sentence or one
imposed in an unlawful manner within 60 days of the entry ofjudgment . . . ." (emphasis added));

ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 32.2 (listing exceptions to the rule precluding collateral challenges based on
arguments that could have been raised on direct appeal, and not including illegal-sentence issues
among the exceptions); see also State v. Dawson, 792 P.2d 741, 749 (Ariz. 1990) ("[We will
continue to decline correction of illegally lenient sentences in the absence of proper appeals or
cross-appeals by the state."); State v. Williams, 2 CA-CR 2009-0354-PR, 2010 WL 972577, at *2
(Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2010) (holding that defendant was precluded from raising an illegalsentence claim after exhausting his direct appeals); State v. Bryant, 200 P.3d 1011, 1014-15
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting the view that illegal sentences are void or that illegal sentences
raise jurisdictional issues, and holding that the State lost its ability to challenge an illegal trial
court order when the State failed to appeal).
178. Compare ME. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) ("On motion of the defendant or the attorney for the
state, or on the court's own motion, made within one year after a sentence is imposed, the justice
or judge who imposed sentence may correct an illegal sentence ..... (emphasis added)), and ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2128(5) (2009) (placing one-year time limit on collateral
postconviction relief from illegal sentences), with, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 ("The court may
correct an illegal sentence at any time."). Maine is also unusually restrictive in its provision for
normal sentencing challenges, even on direct review. Maine requires defendants to raise such
challenges by application to the Maine Supreme Court. Id. § 2151; State v. Frechette, 687 A.2d
628, 629 (Me. 1996) ("Review of the 'propriety' of a sentence is committed to the sentence
review process."). The Maine Supreme Court will intervene only in the event of a
"misapplication of principle." State v. Bolduc, 638 A.2d 725, 727 (Me. 1994). See generally
Aaron T. Morel, Department of Corrections v. Superior Court: Hear No Evil, 48 ME. L. REV.
123, 132-34 (1996) (describing Maine's sentence review process). Maine does, however, allow
defendants to circumvent the sentence review process to raise illegal-sentence issues on direct
appeal without applying to the Maine Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 372 A.2d 570,
572 (Me. 1977) ("Since [an illegal sentence] ... would be 'jurisdictional' in nature, it would, as
such, be cognizable on direct appeal even if asserted for the first time at the appellate level.").
179. Alabama law holds that "[a] challenge to an illegal sentence ... is a jurisdictional matter
than can be raised at any time." ExparteBatey, 958 So. 2d 339, 342 (Ala. 2006).
180. In Montana, "[a]n illegal sentence is void to the extent it exceeds statutory authority;
only the portion of the sentence beyond the district court's statutory authority is illegal." State v.
Coluccio, 214 P.3d 1282, 1288 (Mont. 2009); see also DeShields v. State, 132 P.3d 540, 543
(Mont. 2006) ("A sentence in excess of one prescribed by law is not void ab initio because of the
excess, but is good insofar as the power of the court extends and is invalid only as to the
excess."). This mirrors the limited voidness approach taken in Illinois, see supra note 55, and
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Virginia1 83--provide no real departure from the current, flawed Illinois
approach and therefore provide no alternative to the void sentence
rule. 184
Other states--Georgia,185 New York, 186 Pennsylvania,' 87 and
possibly New Hampshire1 -- cite their trial courts' inherent authority
Virginia, see infra note 183.
181. Under Ohio law, a sentence unauthorized by law is "unlawful" and thus "a nullity and
void." State v. Simpkins, 884 N.E.2d 568, 575 (Ohio 2008), superseded on other grounds by
statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.191 (West 2006), as explained in State v. Singleton, 920
N.E.2d 958, 962-65 (Ohio 2009). "A trial court's jurisdiction over a criminal case is limited after
it renders judgment, but it retains jurisdiction to correct a void sentence and is authorized to do
so." Id.
182. Voidness is but one of two approaches in Oregon. See State v. Pinkowski, 826 P.2d 10,
12 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). Oregon's second approach is discussed infra at notes 235-36. Oregon's
voidness approach states that "any non-conforming sentence is void for lack of authority and thus
totally without legal effect." State v. Leathers, 531 P.2d 901, 903 (Or. 1975).
183. In reaching an illegal-sentence issue that might otherwise have been defaulted, the
Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that "'[w]ant of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by
motion' and that "a circuit court may correct a void or unlawful sentence at any time." Rawls v.
Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 544, 547 (Va. 2009) (quoting Va. Dep't of Corr. v. Crowley, 316
S.E.2d 439, 443 (Va. 1984)). Virginia law considers only the excessive portion of the sentence
void, however; the remainder of the sentence is valid up to the legal maximum. Id. This mirrors
the limited voidness approach taken in Illinois, see supra note 55, and Montana, see supra note
180.
184. Three of these five states have trial courts of limited jurisdiction. See ALA. CONST.
amend. 328, § 6.04(b) ("The circuit court shall exercise general jurisdiction in all cases except as
may otherwise be provided by law."); OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 4.04(B) ("The courts of common
pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters . . . as
may be provided by law."); VA. CONST. art.VI, § 1 ("Subject to [limitations not relevant here],
the General Assembly shall have the power to determine the original and appellate jurisdiction of
the courts of the Commonwealth."). Of the remaining two states, Oregon does not rely
exclusively on jurisdiction and voidness principles, see supra note 182, and Montana's voidness
analysis eschews reliance on jurisdictional principles but provides no alternative basis, see
DeShields v. State, 132 P.3d 540, 542-43 (Mont. 2006).
185. See Harper v. State, 686 S.E.2d 786, 786 n. 1 (Ga. 2009) (stating that the theory allowing
correction of erroneous sentences "'[is] that a sentencing court retains jurisdiction to correct a
void sentence at any time"' (quoting Williams v. State, 523 S.E.2d 857, 860 (Ga. 1999))).
186. People v. Williams, 925 N.E.2d 878, 886 (N.Y. 2010) (noting that "[New York]
precedent has long recognized that courts have the inherent authority to correct illegal sentences"
even after the expiration of the normal one-year statutory period for the State to file a motion to
correct the sentence under N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.40 (McKinney 2005)).
187. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 65 (Pa. 2007) (stating that the trial courts'
corrections of the sentences at issue "[fell] within the limited class of cases amenable to the
exercise by a trial court of the inherent power to correct patent errors despite the absence of
traditional jurisdiction").
188. The source of New Hampshire courts' authority to correct erroneous sentences is not
immediately clear. The New Hampshire Supreme Court recently stated that "the trial court has
the authority to reduce, modify or correct [an illegal sentence] at any time." State v. Fletcher, 965
A.2d 1000, 1003 (N.H. 2009). For this proposition, it relied on State v. Thompson, 263 A.2d 675,
677 (N.H. 1970), and State v. Richard, 106 A.2d 194, 196 (N.H. 1954). Thompson relied on
Richard as well as another case, Doyle v. O'Dowd, 159 A. 301, 302 (N.H. 1932). Richard in turn
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(or continuing jurisdiction) to correct erroneous sentences at any time.
The difficulty with this approach echoes one of the difficulties with
Illinois' current void sentence rule: this inherent authority idea assumes
that sentencing courts retain jurisdiction over their orders to reopen and
correct them long after they had been assumed closed and final. This
idea contravenes one of the most basic principles of appellate review,
which holds, with limited exceptions not applicable in this context, that
a reviewing court may review only a final order. 189 If a final order that
has been appealed becomes retroactively non-final, or retroactively void
in full, then any appeal from that order would likewise become
retroactively void as having been taken prior to a final order or taken
from an order that never existed. 190 To avoid this analytical problem,
any workable rule for correcting erroneous sentences must begin as a
separate action from the action underlying the sentence, not as a delayed
continuation of the underlying action.
Still other states allow defendants to challenge improper sentences
California, 191 Missouri, 192 New
via collateral civil proceedings.
relied on Doyle. Doyle appears to cite only the proposition that a court may correct a clerical
error at any time. See Doyle, 159 A. at 302 ("Apparently the [mistake] by the trial justice was a
mere inadvertence. If so, he has jurisdiction to correct the record to accord with the facts.").
189. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
191. Under California law, a challenge to an unauthorized sentence will not be procedurally
barred on habeas corpus review if it was previously rejected or never raised. People v. Scott, 885
P.2d 1040, 1054 (Cal. 1994) (citing In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391, 405-06 (Cal. 1993), and Neal v.
California, 357 P.2d 839, 842 (Cal. 1961), for the proposition that California courts entertain
habeas corpus review of unauthorized sentences). California allows habeas corpus relief only for
limited grounds that do not expressly include illegal sentences. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1487
(West 2010). However, among the enumerated grounds for habeas corpus relief is the idea that
"the jurisdiction of [a detaining] Court or officer has been exceeded." Id California law has
developed a broad definition of the term "jurisdiction" for purposes of its habeas corpus statute.
See Neal, 357 P.2d at 841 ("The word jurisdiction is not limited to its conventional meaning of
jurisdiction of the cause or the parties when the right to review a decision by a prerogative writ is
the question for decision."). This broad definition of "jurisdiction" gives defendants the right to
challenge improper sentences via habeas corpus. Id. at 841-42; see also People v. Andrade, 121
Cal. Rptr. 2d 923, 925 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Claims involving unauthorized sentences or sentences
entered in excess of jurisdiction can be raised at any time.").
192. Missouri's habeas corpus statute contains the following provision:
No person shall be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of this chapter for the reason
that the judgment by virtue of which such person is confined was erroneous as to time
or place of imprisonment; but in such cases it shall be the duty of the court or officer
before whom such relief is sought to sentence such person to the proper place of
confinement and for the correct length of time from and after the date of the original
sentence, and to cause the officer or other person having such prisoner in charge to
convey him forthwith to such designated place of imprisonment.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 532.400 (2002); see also Thomas v. Dormire, 923 S.W.2d 533, 533 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that defendant who did not challenge the legality of his sentence on direct
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Mexico, 193 South Carolina, 194 Tennessee, 195 and Texas1 96 entertain
such challenges in habeas corpus actions; Massachusetts, 197
Mississippi,198 Nebraska,199 North Carolina,2 0 0 Oklahoma,2 0 1
appeal nonetheless could do so in a collateral proceeding); Merriweather v. Grandison, 904
S.W.2d 485, 487 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (applying section 532.400 to an improper-sentence case).
193. N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-502 (governing habeas corpus review); see N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5801(A) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time pursuant to Rule 5-802 . . . .");
State v. Corbin, 809 P.2d 57, 62 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) ("The district court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time." (citing Rule 5-801(A) and correcting a clerical error)).
194. State v. Johnston, 489 S.E.2d 228, 231 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that defendant had
waived his challenge to illegal sentence on direct appeal but noting that he could pursue his claim
via a writ of habeas corpus), rev'd on other grounds, 510 S.E.2d 423, 425 (S.C. 1999) (agreeing
with appellate court analysis but allowing the defendant relief on direct appeal due to
"exceptional circumstances" of the case). A defendant seeking habeas corpus relief for a matter
cognizable under South Carolina's Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§
17-27-10 to -160 (2003), however, is limited to pursuing the South Carolina Supreme Court's
discretionary constitutional habeas corpus review. Simpson v. State, 495 S.E.2d 429, 431 (S.C.
1998) (citing S.C. CONST. art. V, § 5). That review allows the South Carolina Supreme Court to
correct "violation[s] which, in the setting, constitute[] a denial of fundamental fairness shocking
to the universal sense of justice." Simpson, 495 S.E.2d at 431 n.4 (quoting Butler v. State, 397
S.E.2d 87, 88 (S.C. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Illegal sentences fall within this
definition. Johnston,489 S.E.2d at 231.
195. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-21-101 to -130 (2005); Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256
(Tenn. 2007) ("A habeas corpus petition ... is the proper procedure for challenging an illegal
sentence."). Although Tennessee law states that it will allow habeas corpus relief only from void
judgments, it defines "void judgments" differently than does Illinois law. While the term "void"
in Illinois denotes a jurisdictional defect, in Tennessee it refers to judgments that are "facially
invalid because the court did not have the statutory authority to render such judgment."
Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 256.
196. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.01-65 (West 2005); see Ex Porte Beck, 922
S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (applying habeas corpus relief to an improper sentence,
relying on concepts of voidness). Texas courts may also on their own motions grant habeas
corpus relief to a defendant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.16 (West 2005).
197. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(a) (allowing collateral relief at any time to correct sentences
"imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts"); Commonwealth v. Ravenell, 612 N.E.2d 1142, 1142 (Mass. 1993) (stating that
a defendant may file a motion to correct an illegal sentence at any time).
198. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5(1)(a) (West 2006) (allowing postconviction relief on the
ground "[t]hat the conviction or the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution or laws of Mississippi"). Although Mississippi's Post
Conviction Relief Act contains a time limitation, Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5(2) (West 2006),
Mississippi courts have held that the time limit does not apply to erroneous-sentence claims, Ivy
v. State, 731 So. 2d 601, 603 (Miss. 1999).
199. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-3001 (2008) ("A prisoner in custody under sentence and claiming
a right to be released on the ground that there was such a denial or infringement of the rights of
the prisoner as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Constitution of this state or the
Constitution of the United States, may file a verified motion at any time in the court which
imposed such sentence, stating the grounds relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside
the sentence."); State v. Lotter, 771 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb. 2009) (stating that there is no time
limit for a defendant's filing for relief under section 29-300 1). There is, however, some Nebraska
precedent that relies on voidness concepts for challenges to sentences. See State v. Lotter, 586
N.W.2d 591, 633 (Neb. 1998) ("When a sentence imposed is unauthorized under law, it is void
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Washington, 202 and Wisconsin 203 entertain such challenges through
their versions of what Illinois calls the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.2 04
Although Illinois law allows for either type of proceeding, 2 05 neither is
easily amenable to incorporating a replacement for the void sentence
rule, for the simple reason that Illinois law currently allows the State to
challenge a sentence below the statutory range just as it allows a
defendant to challenge a sentence above the statutory range. 206 Both
civil remedies, however, are designed to be instigated by a defendant or
on a defendant's behalf, not by the State (or a court).207 Thus,
I. . .").

But see Hickman v. Fenton, 231 N.W. 510, 512 (Neb. 1930) (rejecting the argument that

an illegal sentence is void). Hickman was cited in the line of cases leading to Lotter's contrary
statement in 1998. See Lotter, 586 N.W.2d at 633 (citing State v. Wilcox, 479 N.W.2d 134, 136
(Neb. 1992) (citing, inter alia, State v. Gaston, 214 N.W.2d 376, 377 (Neb. 1974) (citing, inter
alia, Hickman, 231 N.W. at 512))). The later cases presumably control, despite their dubious
pedigree.
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415(b)(8) (2007) (listing among grounds for relief that "[tihe
sentence imposed was unauthorized at the time imposed, contained a type of sentence disposition
or a term of imprisonment not authorized for the particular class of offense and prior record ... ,
or is otherwise invalid as a matter of law"); State v. Morgan, 425 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993) (stating that section 1415(b)(8) allows a defendant to bring a motion arguing the illegality
of his or her sentence).
201. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1080(c) (2010) (allowing a collateral attack on a sentence on the
ground that "the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law" and stating no time
limitation); King v. State, 29 P.3d 1089, 1091 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (collecting cases in which
defendants were allowed to raise illegal-sentence challenges collaterally).
202. WASH. R. APP. P. 16.4(c)(2) (listing among grounds for relief that "the sentence ... was
imposed or entered in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or
laws of the State of Washington"); In re Call, 28 P.3d 709, 717 (Wash. 2001) (applying Rule
16.4(c)(2) to a collateral attack on an unauthorized sentence). Although Washington's statute
imposes a one-year time limit on collateral relief, WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.090 (2010),
Washington courts have exempted improper-sentence challenges from the time limit, In re
Goodwin, 50 P.3d 618, 621-22 (Wash. 2002).
203. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 974.06 (West 2008) (allowing postconviction relief on ground that
"the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law" and allowing defendant to file a
motion for such relief "at any time"); see State v. Coolidge, 496 N.W.2d 701, 708 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993) (granting relief to defendant arguing an illegal sentence under section 974.06), abrogated
on other grounds by State v. Tiepelman, 717 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Wis. 2006). Wisconsin's
postconviction remedy is actually not collateral, but is "part of the original criminal action." Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 974.06(2). This postconviction remedy is one of two avenues Wisconsin provides
for correcting erroneous sentences. See infra note 208.
204. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1 to -8 (2008).
205. Id. (Post-Conviction Hearing Act); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-101 to -137 (2008)
(habeas corpus).
206. See People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433, 443 (Ill. 2000) (explaining that a sentence
below the statutory minimum may be corrected on review even though the State may not
normally challenge a defendant's sentence on appeal).
207. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1 ("Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary may institute
a proceeding under [the Post-Conviction Hearing Act] . . . ."); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-102
("Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his or her liberty . . . may apply for habeas
corpus .... ); id. § 5/10-103 ("Application [for habeas corpus relief] shall be made by complaint
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incorporation of improper-sentence claims into Illinois' Post-Conviction
or habeas corpus statutes would do nothing to preserve the State's
ability to challenge an illegally lenient sentence upon the exhaustion of
a direct appeal. Illinois must, therefore, look elsewhere for its solution
to the void sentence problem.
The same difficulty-the absence of recourse for the State in the
event of an erroneously lenient sentence-afflicts Michigan and
Wisconsin statutes that otherwise perfectly codify Illinois' view of
erroneous sentences by declaring only the excess void and the
remainder (up to the maximum) valid.208 Those states' solutions
therefore also fail as alternatives for Illinois' void sentence rule.
B. Other-StateApproaches that Would Work in Illinois
If Illinois were to eschew its void sentence rule, as it should, none of
the above approaches would work as viable replacements to allow
Illinois law to preserve its preferred result that a sentence that deviates
from statutory limits may be corrected at any time. The approaches
used in the remaining U.S. states, however, avoid all of the above
problems, yet still accomplish sentence correction through a very simple
solution: statutes or court rules stating that courts may entertain motions
at any time to correct illegal sentences.
By far the most popular iteration of this approach is the course taken
in federal courts as well as a strong plurality of twenty states. These
jurisdictions have adopted (in some place other than rule or statutory
provisions regarding habeas corpus or Post-Conviction remedies) a
signed by the person for whose relief it is intended, or by some person in his or her behalf . . . .").
Incorporation of the void sentence rule into the Post-Conviction Hearing Act would also require
modification of the Act's time restrictions, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1(c), its waiver
provisions, id. § 5/122-3, and the res judicata preclusion of issues that could have been raised on
direct appeal, People v. Williams, 807 N.E.2d 448, 452 (111.2004), by carving out exceptions for
improper sentences.
208. Michigan's statute provides that whenever a punishment is imposed in excess of that
allowed by law, "the judgment shall not for that reason alone be judged altogether void, nor be
wholly reversed and annulled by any court of review"; rather, "the same shall be valid and
effectual to the extent of the lawful penalty, and shall only be reversed or annulled on writ of
error or otherwise, in respect to the unlawful excess." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.24 (2006); see
also People v. Thomas, 523 N.W.2d 215, 216 (Mich. 1994) (ordering correction of a defendant's
illegal sentence pursuant to a motion he filed "[s]everal months after" his sentence). Wisconsin's
statute provides, "In any case where the court imposes a maximum penalty in excess of that
authorized by law, such excess shall be void and the sentence shall be valid only to the extent of
the maximum term authorized by statute and shall stand commuted without further proceedings."
WIS. STAT. § 973.13 (2008); see also State v. Mikulance, 713 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Wis. Ct. App.
2006) (explaining that procedural waiver bars do not apply to illegal-sentence corrections under
section 973.13). Wisconsin also allows defendants to move to correct erroneous sentences
through collateral civil proceedings. See supra note 203.
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statute or court rule akin to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides, "The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time."209 This language, or very similar language, has been
adopted by rule or statute in Alaska, 21 0 Colorado, 211 Connecticut, 212
Delaware, 213 Florida,214 Hawaii,215 Idaho,2 16 Iowa 217 Kansas,218
Louisiana, 219 Maryland, 220 Minnesota, 221 Nevada, 222 North Dakota, 223
209.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a).

210. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.");
Thibedeau v. State, 617 P.2d 759, 761 (Alaska 1980) (quoting Rule 35(a)).
211. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) ("The court may correct a sentence that was not authorized by
law or that was imposed without jurisdiction at any time . . . ."); People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d
410, 414 (Colo. 2005) ("[A] court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.").
212. CONN. SUPER. CT. R. 43-22 ("The judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal
sentence or other illegal disposition .... ); State v. Tabone, 902 A.2d 1058, 1062 (Conn. 2006)
(stating that a court may correct an illegal sentence at any time).
213. DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time . . . ."); Boyer v. State, No. 418,2002, 2003 WL 21810824, at *2 (Del. Aug. 4, 2003)
(providing that the court may "correct an illegal sentence at any time"); State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d
1198, 1203 (Del. 2002) (Steele, J., dissenting) (explaining that an illegal sentence may be
corrected at any time before disputing the majority's interpretation of a related point of law).
214. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.800(a) ("A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed
by it . . . ."); Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1176 (Fla. 2001) (reciting history of Florida's rule
that an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time).
215. HAW. R. PENAL P. 35(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time .
State v. Fry, 602 P.2d 13, 16 (Haw. 1979) ("The court can always reform an illegal sentence.").
216. IDAHO CRIM. R. 35(a) ("The court may correct a sentence that is illegal from the face of
the record at any time."); State v. Clements, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (Idaho 2009) ("Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 is a narrow rule that allows a trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time .... .").
217. IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.24(5)(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.");
State v. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2010) ('[1I]llegal sentences may be corrected at any
time.").
218. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3504(1) (West 2010) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time."); State v. McCoin, 101 P.3d 1204, 1207 (Kan. 2004) (stating the rule that the court
may "correct an illegal sentence at any time").
219. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 882(A) (2008) ("An illegal sentence may be corrected
at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review."); State v.
Sanders, 876 So. 2d 42, 42 (La. 2004) (per curiam) (stating that courts may correct sentences
outside the statutory range at any time).
220. MD. R. 4-345(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time."); State v.
Wilkins, 900 A.2d 765, 767 (Md. 2006) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time.").
221. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.03, subdiv. 9 ("The court may at any time correct a sentence not
authorized by law."); State v. Cook, 617 N.W.2d 417, 418 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) ("The district
court has jurisdiction at any time to correct a sentence that is not authorized by law.").
222. NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.555 (2010) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time."); Edwards v. State, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (Nev. 1996) (explaining that time limitations do not
apply to a trial court's power to correct an illegal sentence).
223. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) ("The sentencing court may correct an illegal sentence at any time
... ."); State v. Leingang, 763 N.w.2d 769, 773 (N.D. 2009) (explaining that a sentence outside
statutory limits is an "illegal sentence" and that Rule 35 allows "a sentencing court [to] correct an
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Rhode Island, 224 South Dakota,225 Utah, 226 Vermont, 227 West
Virginia,228 and Wyoming. 229 This simple rule avoids the troublesome
jurisdictional lexicon that plagues Illinois jurisprudence on the subject,
reaches the same result as the "inherent power" states without resorting
to concepts of interminable sentencing court jurisdiction, by its
language does not suffer from the time (and other) constraints that
hinder defendants' habeas corpus or Post-Conviction remedies, and is
not limited to relief for defendants as are the Michigan and Wisconsin
statutes.
The three remaining states-Indiana, Kentucky, and New Jersey-as
well as Oregon, which provides two avenues for correction of illegal
sentences, 230 have devised unique statutes or court rules to confront the
erroneous-sentence problem. Indiana law provides, "If [a] convicted
person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not render the
sentence void"; instead, the sentence should be corrected after notice to
the defendant. 23 1 Through two separate court rules, Kentucky allows a
prisoner to bring a motion attacking his or her sentence on the ground
that it is either "subject to collateral attack" 232 or that the judgment
illegal sentence at any time").
224. R.I. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time."); State v.
Linde, 965 A.2d 415, 416 (R.I. 2009) (stating that sentences correctable at any time under Rule
35(a) include those in excess of statutory limits).
225. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-31-1 (Rule 35) (2010) ("A court may correct an illegal
); State v. Kramer, 754 N.W.2d 655, 656 (S.D. 2008) (quoting Rule
sentence at any time .
35).
226. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence . . . at any time.");

State v. Candedo, 232 P.3d. 1008, 1016 (Utah 2010) (stating that a sentence beyond statutory
limits is illegal and that illegal sentences may be corrected at any time).
227. VT. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time .... .");
State v. Oscarson, 898 A.2d 123, 126 (Vt. 2006) (stating that an illegal sentence is one not
authorized by statute and that such sentences may be corrected at any time).
228. W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time....");
State v. McBride, 658 S.E.2d 547, 554 (W. Va. 2007) (quoting and applying Rule 35(a)).
229. WYo. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.");
Endris v. State, 223 P.3d 578, 583 (Wyo. 2010) ("'Our rules of criminal procedure authorize a
trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time."' (quoting Sarr v. State, 166 P.3d 891, 895
(Wyo. 2007)).
230. See supra note 182; infra notes 235-36.
231. IND. CODE § 35-38-1-15 (2004); see also Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 785-86
(Ind. 2004) (holding that section 35-38-1-15 provides an alternative avenue of collateral relief
from an illegal sentence, without any time limitation). This statute, unlike those in Michigan and
Wisconsin, see supra note 208, does not limit its application to excessive sentences.
232. KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42(1); see Myers v. Commonwealth, 42 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Ky. 2001)
(identifying Rule 11.42(1) as an avenue to challenge an illegal sentence), overruled on other
grounds by McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. 2010). The rule's reference to
grounds for a "collateral attack" likely stems from its history as an attempt to modernize, and thus
displace, traditional habeas corpus remedies. See generally John S. Gillig, Kentucky Post-
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warrants extraordinary relief.233 In addition to the voidness rationale
described above, 234 Oregon also has a statute stating that a sentencing
court "retain[s] authority irrespective of any notice of appeal after entry
of judgment of conviction to modify its judgment and sentence to
correct any arithmetic or clerical errors or to delete or modify any
erroneous term in the judgment"; 2 35 this language has been interpreted
to apply to sentences that fall outside the statutory range. 236 New Jersey
has a court rule providing that "[a] motion may be filed and an order
may be entered at any time . . . correcting a sentence not authorized by

law." 237
If adopted in place of the void sentence rule, any of these latter
approaches-the approach based on Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the four unique approaches taken in Indiana,
Kentucky, New Jersey, and Oregon-would relieve the tension between
the void sentence rule and incompatible constitutional principles. The
Rule 35 approach, however, promises something the unique approaches
cannot: the trappings of conformity. If it were to adopt a rule akin to
that used in federal courts and twenty state courts, Illinois would
appropriate a ready-made and extensive library of authority illuminating
the nuances of the rule in each of the jurisdictions that use it. That
possibility-an Illinois scheme for correcting sentences that is cohesive
not just with the remainder of Illinois law but also with a plurality of
United States jurisdictions-strongly commends Rule 35 to Illinois law.
C. How Illinois Could Adopt Rule 35 of the FederalRules of Criminal
Procedure
The above discussion thus suggests a somewhat ironic solution to the
void sentence problem. The problem, created by the Illinois courts'
improper reliance on statutes to define their jurisdictional reach, can be
solved by the enactment of a statute. The difference, of course, is that a
new statute adopting Rule 35 would not purport to define circuit court

Conviction Remedies and the Judicial Development of Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure

11.42, 83 KY. L.J. 265 (1994-1995) (discussing Kentucky law for collateral challenges to
incarceration).
233. Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02; see Myers, 42 S.W.3d at 596 (citing Rule 60.02 as an avenue to
challenge an illegal sentence).
234. See supra note 182.

235. OR. REv. STAT. § 138.083 (2010).
236. State v. Graham, 923 P.2d 664, 665-66 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
237. N.J. R. CT. 3:21-10(b); see State v. Murray, 744 A.2d 131, 134-36 (N.J. 2000)
(discussing challenges to illegal sentences that could be filed under former version of Rule 3:2212, which had an illegal-sentence provision that is now contained in Rule 3:21-10(b)).
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jurisdiction; rather, it would create a justiciable matter (a challenge to a
sentence) with no statutory time limit.
As for how this statutory change could be implemented, the solution
is quite simple. Section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure 2 38 already contains a scheme through which parties may
obtain relief from judgments, including criminal judgments. 239 In fact,
section 2-1401 has been used to challenge sentences under the void
sentence rule.240 As it now reads, section 2-1401 provides that, with
three specific exceptions, a petition for relief "must be filed not later
than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment" unless the party
seeking relief was under duress or disability or the ground for relief was
fraudulently concealed. 24 1 It would be a simple matter indeed for the
legislature to add a fourth exception by adopting Rule 35's language
that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time." In so
doing, the legislature would compel Illinois courts not only to
acknowledge the problems created by the void sentence rule but also to
fix them by renouncing the rule in favor of the new legislative
enactment.
There are but two immediate difficulties with the solution that Illinois
incorporate Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure into its
section 2-1401, and neither difficulty is significant. First, because
section 2-1401 provides for a collateral action for relief from judgment,
it could not confer to parties the opportunity to correct an improper
sentence on direct review (i.e., disregard any forfeiture caused by the
failure to raise the sentencing issue before the trial court). Thus, if the
void sentence rule were to be replaced through changes to section 21401, Illinois law would have to make two more changes to
accommodate the interests of defendants and the State to challenge
improper sentences on direct appeal. To vindicate defendants' interests,
courts would have to invoke Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a),242
238.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401 (2008).

239. People v. Harvey, 753 N.E.2d 293, 295 (Ill. 2001) ("Although a section 2-1401 petition
is usually characterized as a civil remedy, its remedial powers extend to criminal cases.").
240. E.g., People v. Wuebbels, 919 N.E.2d 1122, 1127 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (upholding
defendant's section 2-1401 challenge to an order providing that his sentences be served
consecutively, because the order was void for lack of statutory authority). There is some
authority to suggest that section 2-1401 petitions should be confined to relief due to factual, rather
than legal, errors. See People v. Pinkonsly, 802 N.E.2d 236, 243-44 (111.2003). However, to the
extent this distinction exists, the prevalence of section 2-1401 challenges to "void" sentences
demonstrates that the distinction has never precluded challenges to erroneous sentences under
section 2-1401.
241. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401(c).
242. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 615(a).

2011]

Filling the Void

467

which allows reviewing courts to reach unpreserved issues (issues
raised for the first time on appeal) when the claimed error is so serious
that it affects the defendant's substantial rights. 243 To ensure the State's
chance to challenge an improperly lenient sentence on direct review, the
Illinois Supreme Court would have to amend Supreme Court Rule
604(a),2 4 4 which limits the orders the State may challenge on direct
appeal.
The second immediate, but ultimately insignificant, difficulty with
amending section 2-1401 to allow for challenges to illegal sentences at
any time is that doing so would create a potentially confusing scheme in
which a defendant must invoke different collateral proceedings (habeas
corpus proceedings, Post-Conviction proceedings, and section 2-1401
proceedings) for different remedies. Although such a scheme might
normally unduly hinder a defendant's attempts to obtain collateral
relief, Illinois common law has already devised a panacea for any such
confusion. Illinois law now holds that, regardless of the statutory
provision invoked by a defendant seeking collateral review, the trial
court may consider the challenge under the most appropriate statutory
provision. 245 This rule would surely apply to allow a court to
recharacterize as a section 2-1401 action a defendant's otherwise
labeled challenge to an illegal sentence. With these two minor
difficulties addressed, the incorporation of Rule 35 into section 2-1401
would provide a tenable means to correct erroneous sentences and thus
displace the misbegotten void sentence rule.
IV. CONCLUSION

Illinois' void sentence rule contravenes the Illinois Constitution by
holding that the circuit court has no jurisdiction to impose sentences
beyond statutory limits. Despite this problem, however, the rule has,
through repetition alone, become entrenched in Illinois law. So long as
243. Id. ("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they
were not brought to the attention of the trial court."); People v. Piatkowski, 870 N.E.2d 403, 40910 (Ill. 2007) (explaining the plain-error rule). Applying the plain-error rule to erroneous
sentences would not require an appreciable leap. See People v. Dover, 728 N.E.2d 90, 98 (111.
App. Ct. 2000) ("Because the 'right to be lawfully sentenced is a substantial right,'
'impermissible or illegal sentences may be attacked on appeal as plainly erroneous . . . .
(quoting People v. WNVhitney, 697 N.E.2d 815, 817 (111. App. Ct. 1998))).
244. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 604(a).
245. See People v. Shellstrom, 833 N.E.2d 863, 867-70 (Ill. 2005). In Shellstrom, the Illinois
Supreme Court explained at length the rationale behind allowing the trial court to consider a
defendant's collateral challenge under the proper statutory provision; those reasons all centered
on the policy of ensuring that a defendant's collateral challenge receives a fair hearing. See id. at
867-68 (articulating policy rationale).
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Illinois law continues to suffer the rule, it will reflect, and perpetuate,
longstanding confusion regarding the state's fundamental jurisdictional
principles. To reverse this confusion, Illinois should cease its repetition
of the void sentence rule, and renounce it.
As a practical matter, however, Illinois courts likely will not do so
until the rule has been displaced by some viable alternative that compels
the same result: that sentences outside statutory bounds may be
corrected at any time. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides just such an alternative, and one that would bring
Illinois law into harmony with that of federal courts and courts in
twenty sister states. Thus, to supplant the void sentence rule, the Illinois
legislature should incorporate Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure into section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.
Only then can Illinois law turn back the accumulated weight of
repetition buttressing the void sentence rule and replace those words
with something more substantial: a rule that honors the jurisdictional
principles of the Illinois Constitution.

